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INTRODUCTION
Our world changes constantly. This is the very essence of history.
The task of the historian is to reason about the features, conditions,
and impact of these changes. It is also within the historian's province to
observe what seems to remain unaltered by the course of time and to
investigate the reasons behind such endurance.
This article was inspired by the work of a series of state task forces
on women in the courts.' It examines the subject from a historical
perspective,2 comparing ancient Rome, mainly during the period from
the first century B.C. to the third A.D.,' with the United States, from
its prerevolutionary beginnings to the present.4 The article's focus is
gender bias against women5 acting in official court functions.
6
1. On state gender bias task forces see, e.g., LYNN HECHT ScHAFRAN & NORMx J.
WIKER, OPERATING A TASK FORCE ON GENDER BuS IN THE COURTS (1986);
Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L REv. 1682, 1684-85 nn.8-11, 1693-94, 1700, 1768 (1991);
Norma J. Wilder & Lynn Hecht Schafran, Learning from the NewJersey Supreme
Court Task Force on Women in the Courts: Evaluation, Recommendations and Implica-
tionsfrr Other States, 12 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 313 (1991).
2. "We need fewer abstract theoretical typologies and more historically and empirically
grounded analyses." DEBORAH L RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DIsCIuMINA-
TION AND THE LAW 317 (1989).
3. See, e.g., MAX KASER, ROMAN PsRvArn LAW (Rolf Dannenbring trans., 3d ed.
1980); WOLFGANG KUNKI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND CONSTITU-
roNA . HISTORY (J.M. Kelly trans., 1966); Farrz SCHULZ, CLASsicAL RoMAN LAw
(1951); FRrTz SCHULZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENcE (1953) [hereinafter
SCHULZ, ROMAN LA.AL SCIENCE]; OLCA TELLEGEN-CouPRus, A SHORT HISTORY
oF ROMAN LAw (1993); ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW & COMPARATIvE LAW (1991).
4. For women's legal history in the United States, see JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND
INJUsTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY oF U.S. WOMEN (1991). For a historical survey of the
American woman in official court functions, see KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE
INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 TO THE PRESENT (1986).
For the leading cases concerning women in the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, see LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
WOMEN (2d ed. 1988). Unless otherwise indicated, the quotations of American
material such as letters, speeches, articles, etc. are taken from HoF, supra, and
MoREL.o, supra, and the citations are based on the form these authors use.
5. For feminist legal theory and current discussions in feminist jurisprudence, see, e.g.,
FEMImST JURISPRUDENCE (Patricia Smith ed., 1993); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEmINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, STATE]; DEBORAH L.
RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRtMINTION AND THE LAW (1989); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L 1 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider et al., "FeministJuriprudence: The
199oMyra Bradwell Day Pane4 1 COLUM. J. GENDER & L 5 (1991).
6. For a discussion of current issues concerning women lawyers, see, e.g., MONA
HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE RULES (1993); Marilyn J. Berger
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Although remote from each other in time and cultural develop-
ment,7 Roman and American gender-biased arguments and rules bear
strong resemblances. The similarities appear in semantics and attitudes
as well as in social strategies and legal techniques s Thus, what might at
first seem to be an exercise in historical sophistry reveals surprising
parallels once the ancient and modern sources are compared. 9
I begin this article by addressing some fundamental rules of con-
structing gender and sustaining male dominance.1" Subsequently, I
highlight several strikingly similar issues, approaches, and tactics in
Roman and American legal discourse that both reflect and produce
gender bias.1 After examining the devices that have oppressed women
in their roles as attorneys, jurors, and judges," I observe how the law
functions generally as a crucial tool of patriarchy. 3
& Kari A. Robinson, Woman's Ghetto Within the Legal Profession, 8 Wis. WOMEN's
L.J. 71 (1992-93); Resnik, supra note 1, at 1682-1772.
7. For feminist perspectives on history see, e.g., BONNIE S. ANDERSON & JuDrT P.
ZINSSER, A HIsTORY OF THEIR OWN: WOMEN IN EUROPE FROM PREHIsToRY TO
THE PRESENT (1988); EVA CANT ' uA, PANDORA's DAUGHTERs: THE ROLE AND
STATUS OF WOMEN IN GREK AND ROMA ANIQurrY (Maureen B. Fant trans.,
1987); JANE F. GARDNER, WOMEN IN ROMAN LAW AND SoCIETY (1986); MARY R.
LEFKOWITZ & MAUREEN B. FANT, WoMEN'S LIFE IN GREECE AND ROME: A SOURCE
BOOK IN TRANSLATION (2d ed. 1992); GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF FEMrIIST
CONSCIOUSNESS (1993); GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986);
WOMEN'S HISTORY AND ANCIENT HISTORY (Sarah B. Pomeroy ed., 1991).
For a methodological discussion of women's (legal) history, see, e.g., Eileen
Boris, Looking at Women's Historians Looking at "Difference, " 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J.
213 (1987).
8. "We need to know precisely how the benefits and burdens of this system are
allocated.... We need to know how this system gives each woman a survival stake
in the system that is killing her." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, The Art of the
Impossibk, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 5, at 2 [hereinafter MACKINNON,
Art].
9. "The complex and fundamental connections, however, between law and patriarchy
in a more general historical context have not been adequately developed, and these
connections are essential to an understanding of political and social power." Janet
Rifdn, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HAnv. WOMEN'S L.J. 83, 89
(1980).
10. See infia part I.
11. See infra parts II. through V.
12. For a general survey of American women in the legal profession, see CYNTHIA
FUCHS EPSTEiN, WOMEN IN LAW (2d ed. 1993).
13. See infra part VI. "The only real question is what is and is not a gender question.
Once no amount of difference justifies treating women as subhuman, eliminating
that is what equality law is for." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMrNIsM UNMODIFIED, supra note 5, at 43
[hereinafter MACKINNON, Difference].
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I. GENDER DISCOURSE, PATRIARCHY, AND RULE MAKING
Patriarchy is a regime. A regime works through rules.' 4 Patriarchy
works specifically by way of gender rules. The regime of patriarchal
dominance is based primarily on a distinction between the male and
female sexes.
Like all societal rules, patriarchy's rules can have an impact on facts
and on other rules; additionally, some rules and factual scenarios are
expressions of yet other rules. This interrelation is not a static system
but a dynamic network in which norms are proposed and subsequently
more or less accepted. Its dynamics conform to the pattern of a dia-
logue; similar to a dialogue, in which the partners are both speakers and
listeners and are interrelated by mutually expressing and receiving
messages, there is a normative interrelation both between different rules
and between rules and facts. The communication of messages that
represent or refer to rules constitutes the normative discourse.
In this dynamic process, rules and facts interrelate in two ways. On
the one hand, a rule can be applied to facts; this results in a rule-gov-
erned state of facts. On the other hand, a certain state of facts can be
used as the basis for developing a rule. That is, a state of facts can be
perceived and presented as a case to guide future similar cases.
These general tenets supply the main perspectives for the historical
analysis that follows. These tenets are further developed in Part A of
this section on the notions of sex and gender and the nature of gender
rules, in Part B on the fundamental components of patriarchy's success
strategy, and in Part C on the connection between rules and cases and
the normative use of certain cases by treating them as exemplary.
A. Making and Remaking Gender
Although there is no clear-cut distinction between the concepts of
sex and gender, it is useful to acknowledge a difference in their conno-
tations. Notwithstanding the ways in which their meanings are
culturally defined, the male and female sexes are biological categories,
14. Here and in the following sections, "rule" is used broadly as a general description of
an articulation with normative character. It is used without regard for the different
types of rles (laws, morals, customs, etc.) or for their various degrees of elaboration
(principles, maxims, commands, etc.).
[Vol. 3:195
WOMEN IN THE COURTS
whereas gender notions are primarily societal constructs.15 Gender
denotes a set of rules that society establishes primarily by reference to
the male or female sex." In other words, gender roles are norms created
15. This description is intended to clarify the analytical approach of the following
discussions. Nevertheless, in making this distinction, I do not intend to ignore the
definitional problems of "sex" and "gender" or to disregard the fact that the two
concepts are dosely interrelated. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 2, at 5.
The notions of feminine and masculine gender reflect the societal roles and
expectations associated with the female and male sexes. In short, female or male sex
indicates and allocates certain rules, whereas feminine and masculine gender are
these rules. Therefore, a distinctly normative discourse (such as legal reasoning)
requires using terms of gender instead of terms of sex. Reducing such a discussion
to terms of sex is problematic because it obscures those who enjoy the benefits and
those who bear the burdens under the regime at issue and obfuscates the way in
which that regime works.
For example, the Supreme Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct.
1419 (1994) held that "the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury
selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption that an individual will be
biased in a particular case for no reason other than the fact that the person happens
to be a woman or happens to be a man." Id. at 1430. See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 211-225. The assumption with which the Court was concerned is
based on roles and expectations related to men and women and therefore is a
matter of gender, not of sex.
Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion, refused to view the issue as one of gender
discrimination and instead viewed it as an issue of sex discrimination. J.E.B., 114
S. Ct. at 1436 n.1. This approach, however, distorts the problem, since the crucial
issue in the case was whether peremptory strikes of potential jurors would be
legitimate if based on certain masculine or feminine attitudes. A lawyer's concern
with whether a juror is a man or a woman is not about the juror's physical qualities
but about stereotypical ways that men and women perceive, feel, think, and act.
The lawyer is actually concerned with the juror's gender, not with his or her sex.
Justice Scalia observes that the case ignored the possibility of effeminate men and
exclusively connected masculine attitudes to any person of male sex and feminine
attitudes to any person of female sex. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1436 n.1 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia's reference to effeminate men suggests that he himself
conducts a gender discourse, however resolutely he denies doing so. Scalia's own
assumption seems to be that effeminate men have feminine attitudes and that these
attitudes might be relevant to juror impartiality.
A closer look at Scalia's reference to effeminate men raises further questions
about gender: what is meant by these effeminate men? Are they transsexual men
(persons who feel that they have a "female" personality despite having a male body)
or gay men (men who have a masculine identity but a sexual orientation directed
toward the male sex) or pro-feminist men (men who are committed to feminist atti-
tudes)?
16. As a rule, the gender typology (feminine and masculine) constructs a parallel
correspondence with the sex typology (female and male). Generally, masculine is
associated with male and feminine with female. However, the gender regime inverts
this association with respect to homosexuals by stereotyping lesbians as "masculine"
and gay men as "feminine." See infra part V.B.
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by society and, like any human role, belong to society's normative
texture.17 This normative texture functions as an internal, self-relational
structure; society not only makes its rules but is at the same time made
by its rules."
Since gender subsists in sets of norms, any remark on gender
inevitably entails a normative discourse. Speaking of, or otherwise
referring to, gender necessitates evaluating the "rules" of gender. There
is no indifference about gender rules.19 To agree explicitly with gender
rules strengthens them; to criticize gender rules weakens them; and
when gender rules are not attacked, but tacitly accepted, they are con-
firmed. Even that which seems merely descriptive or politically neutral
implicitly consents to and thus supports the existing norms.
In order to understand how the regime of gender bias works, one
must inquire into the grammar, the syntax, and the vocabulary that
govern the ways of perceiving, thinking, and expressing attitudes toward
either sex.20 Thus, the subject of.women in the courts must be regarded
as part of the general gender discourse. Statements about gender must
be examined for the approach they take, for the reasoning they purport,
and for the specific aspects of gender roles they imply. The analysis
must focus on the normative quality of the statements and relate them
to the structures and dynamics of societal rules, such as morals, cus-
toms, and laws.21
17. "Gender is a social system that divides power. It is therefore a political system."
MACKINNON, STATE, supra note 5, at 160. See also NANcY FRASER, UNRULY
PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CoNTEmPoRARY SocIAL THEoRY
(1989).
18. I regard notions concerning transcendental sources of society's rules as philosophical
or theological subjects that lie beyond the framework of this study. This limitation
of approach is well founded for two reasons. First, it complies with the common
concept of legal and social science. Second, although reference to transcendental
normative sources still plays an important role in society's discourse, as a matter of
principle, those sources are not to be considered as prior or superior to others.
19. "Simply by treating the status quo as 'the standard,' it invisibly and uncritically
accepts the arrangements under male supremacy." MAcKINNON, Difference, supra
note 13, at 43.
20. "But if gender is an inequality first, constructed as a socially relevant differentiation
in order to keep that inequality in place, then sex inequality questions are questions
of systematic dominance, of male supremacy, which is not at all abstract and is
anything but a mistake." MACKINNON, Difference, supra note 13, at 42 (emphasis
added).
21. "[Men's forms of dominance over women have been accomplished socially as well
as economically, prior to the operation of law, without express state acts, often in
intimate contexts, as everyday life." MAcKmNoN, STATE, supra note 5, at 161.
[Vol. 3:195
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B. Basics of the Patriarchal Program
Before further discussing related questions and sources, it is helpful
to describe the fundamental rules of the normative discourse that serve
as a framework for the subsequent analysis. Consider the following
tenets of the "Patriarchal Program" that establish and maintain success-
ful supremacy-
1. Power creates truth. Let your power create your truth. Express
your truth and power as if they were crucial for the existence and
welfare of society as a whole.
2. Construct and exert your dominance by establishing public
forms of societal discourse.
3. Economize the forms of discourse by setting up institutional
structures. Camouflage your power in the anonymity of the institutional
structures.
4. Be rational. Create seemingly consistent rules of discourse. Act
as if your rules reflect reality and promote society. Call it logic.
5. Be irrational. Establish some issues beyond rational discourse.
Create your myths.
6. Be irrational. Create your logic, but break your own rules
occasionally to assert your overwhelming power.
7. Immunize your fundamental concepts against critical attack by
calling these concepts "natural" or "essential," thus disguising norms as
phenomena of some physical reality and pretending they are valid
regardless of historic conditions.
8. Whenever you express your concept of nature, exercise a mo-
nopoly in interpreting it.
9. Be ignorant and arrogant. Check any critical approach to your
dominance by selectively paralyzing the discourse. Check the develop-
ment of a critical discourse already in progress through discretionary
misunderstandings and misrepresentations.
10. Set standards with which your addressees can comply. Demand
compliance and reward it by conferring some benefit upon the rule-
abiding addressees.
11. Set a number of standards with which the addressees cannot
comply. Ensure your addressees' failure, and punish it.
12. Equality, fairness, and justice have always been intrinsic com-
ponents of the law and indispensable factors of its coherence. Therefore,
where possible, dominate your addressees through non-legal rules.
13. Monopolize means of coercion, including violence, to express
and execute your supremacy.
19951
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C. Example: See This Case; It Tells Us a Rule
Patriarchal supremacy, characterized by the above tenets, has been
established and upheld by various methods of rule making. A frequent
and effective way to shape and strengthen a rule is to transform a set of
facts into a case and to posit that case as an example. Elevating a case
to the level of a normative example is a common practice in the norma-
tive discourse.
A set of facts becomes a "case" as soon as these facts are evaluated.
Evaluating facts entails finding the norms that seem most appropriate to
govern the case and to express its significance. When a case is presented
as an example, some features of its underlying norms are distinguished
and endorsed. Proffering the case as an example endows the case with
the authority to serve as a guide for future situations involving similar
issues. This process brings forth a norm with a specific articulation, a
distinct history, and an enhanced imperative quality.22
Not every example, however, has a normative character. There are
examples that merely serve to illustrate; they solely comment on and
explain an already existing pattern and have no guiding, normative
impact. These kinds of examples are to a certain extent fungible and
incidental. The examples with which we are concerned, on the other
hand, have a different nature and function. These examples do wield
normative power because they have been vested with a normative
impact.
Creating such examples both confirms certain norms and develops
the texture of societal rules. Positing a case as an example is perhaps the
smoothest, most unspectacular method of instituting a norm. Therefore,
it can be a particularly useful tool for exerting dominance. In contrast
to rules that are articulated in a purely general and abstract way, exam-
ples are concretely linked to the facts of the case; since examples seem
to be part of practical life, they have a direct and compelling appeal.2 3
22. For the normative nature of examples in general and specifically in the making of
Roman law, see Nikolaus Benke, Exemplum contra legem, LVII TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 275 (1989). For the common use of exempla in legal reason-
ing, see NIa.As LUHmANqN, DAS RECHT DER GasEuscmn 349 (1993).
23. Making rules by way of example also works when the case at issue is a stereotyped
or even a hypothetical case. Again, regarding such a case as an example means
forming and developing a rule. In a certain respect, such examples do not lack
"realism." Even if an example is not developed by use of a historic incident, its style
is specific and concrete rather than general and abstract. This makes an example
(Vol. 3:195
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Furthermore, since examples are cases, their normative potential is
mediated by the specific facts of the case. An example is a cluster of
specific facts and the various normative elements that are employed to
evaluate those facts. Thus, an example reveals a normative nature that is
less definite and more adaptable than, for instance, a single, abstractly
determined rule. As a consequence, the example is perceived as less
oppressive than abstract and generalized rules and is therefore more
readily accepted. At the same time, its normative impact is more diffi-
cult to grasp, analyze, and control than that of a clear-cut rule. Thus,
examples permit more flexibility and discretion in their application than
clear-cut rules.
24
II. CARFANIA'S CASE: AN ARCHETYPAL STORY
The Roman sources tell us about one intriguing example
(exemplum) of discrimination against women in court; I call this exam-
ple Carfania's case. It provides rich material, both in form and sub-
stance, for discussing women's roles in official court functions. On the
one hand, Carfania's case exhibits the method of developing rules by
making a case into an example. On the other hand, its substantive
reasoning reflects gender stereotypes that have endured throughout
history.
A. The Momentous Example of Carfania
Carfania's case is important for discourses on gender in general;
but more than that, it is a legal example and must be viewed as part of
the legal discourse. Legal discourse must be understood as a specialized
discipline. The Romans were the first to establish the law as a discipline
specialized by an autonomous legal profession; they developed numer-
ous legal constructs and types of legal reasoning that are still in use.
2 5
"real," although its reality is fictitious. Subsequently, when such an example is
referred to in acts of rule application, this process relates the example to actual
reality and is apt to endorse its ruling. See Benke, supra note 22, at 280-307.
24. See Benke, supra note 22, at 278.
25. There was law before the Roman civilization, but the Romans defined and cultivat-
ed law as a distinct, highly sophisticated technique-the Romans invented legal
science. One innovative step toward making the law a specialized discipline was to
disconnect it from religion. See SCHULZ, ROMAN LEcAL SCIENCE, supra note 3, at
80-81. Requiring special expertise, the law was the domain of a very distinguished
1995]
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Carfania's case involves the capacity of Roman women to act for
others in court. In terms of Roman legal procedures, acting in court
focused on postulare, which technically meant making applications to
the judicial authority in order to initiate claims and move for defenses."'
Before Carfania's case led to an edice 7 prohibiting women from
representing others in court, Roman women seem to have enjoyed the
same litigation rights as men. 8 This is remarkable because Rome during
that period maintained a profoundly patriarchal societal order,29 includ-
ing highly developed legal institutions."° As a whole, Rome after the
group of men, the Roman jurists. Although there were various types of legal sources
such as statutes, edicts, and resolutions of the Senate, Roman law lived and flour-
ished in the body of the legal opinions given by the Roman jurists. See, e.g.,
SCHuLz, RoMAN LEAL SCiENCE, supra note 3, at 141-257.
26. The Roman sources treat this issue under the notion De Postulando, which is
mainly covered by Title 3.1 in the Digest of Justinian. "Postulare autem est
desiderium suum vet amid sui in lure apud cum, qui iurisdictioni praeest, exponere: vet
alerius desiderio contradicere." DIG. 3.1.1.2 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum). (Translation:
But to make applications is to bring forth one's own claim or that of one's friend in
due proceedings before the official administering the law, or to oppose the claim of
another.) (All translations have been provided by the author.)
Considering the meaning of "in court," it must be kept in mind that the
Roman iudex, who only took evidence and decided the cases, had a role different
from and less extensive than that of a modem judge. All the preliminary issues,
such as access to litigation, the right to file claims or move for defenses, and specific
substantive requirements of particular claims and defenses, were th" province of
another official, the praetor. When speaking of postulare, the sources are discussing
applications to the praetor. For a brief survey of the roles of praetor and iudex in a
Roman lawsuit, see TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, supra note 3, at 53-59.
27. An edictum is one of the types of Roman legal sources. The style of an edictum is
typically general and abstract. Since an edictal provision can be formulated without
a legal sanction, the edictum may contain maxims of legal policy as well as legal
directives. See Walter Selb, Das prdtorische Edikt: vom rechtspolitischen Programm zur
Norm, FEsrscHmFvr KASER 259-72 (1986). For Roman magistrates' edicts in the
second and first centuries B.C., see, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LAW MAKING IN THE
LAmR RoMAN REPUBLIC 31-87 (1974).
28. Until the Civil War, the American common law tradition was in many respects
much more oppressive to women than the Roman law of the late republic and the
pre-Constantine empire. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 7, at 257-65. See also
Blackstone's famous dictum, "[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person
in law- that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the hus-
band...." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CommENTAuIs *442 (1765) (footnote omit-
ted). See also infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
29. See, e.g., CANrAwLLA, supra note 7, at 113.
30. See generaly SCHULZ, RoMAN LEGAL SCIENcE, supra note 3, at 38-98.
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Punic Wars 1 appears as an urban society with citizens capable of
meeting Hellenistic intellectual challenges, a manifoldly structured
commercial life,32 and networks of extensively differentiated societal and
legal structures?3
Women's litigation rights were abridged in the second quarter of
the first century B.C., when one woman, Carfania, allegedly irritated a
magistrate so deeply by her vexatious applications that all women were
subsequently excluded from making applications on behalf of others.
3 4
The general prohibition that ensued from Carfania's case is certainly
not the first legal provision to discriminate against women," but it is
the first evidence in Western tradition of a misogynous policy
articulated through elaborate legal reasoning. The Roman jurist
Ulpianus,36 writing approximately in 190-223 A.D., reports the
magistrate's rule; the text is transmitted in the Digest of Justinian:
Secundo loco edictum proponitur in eos, qui pro aliis ne postuLent: in
quo edicto excepit praetor sexum et casum, item notavit personas in
turpitudine notabiles.
31. The third Punic War ended in 146 B.C.
32. For a discussion of Roman social and legal life, Roman intellect, and Roman
economy, see generally JOHN A. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME (1967); ELzA-
BETH RAWSON, INTELLEcruA LIFE IN THE LTE ROMAN REPUBUC 3-114 (1985);
MosEs I. FINLEY, THE ANcImr ECONOMY (2d ed. 1985).
33. For a historical discussion of these structures, see generally KUNKEL, supra note 3, at
35-116.
34. For a brief survey of Roman women in civil procedures, see Anthony J. Marshall,
Ladies at Law: The Role of Women in the Roman Civil Courts, in V STUDIES IN
LLnN IxTE.ATURE AND ROMAN HisroRY 35-54 (C. Deroux ed., 1989).
35. Some examples are the Lex Oppia (215 B.C., Lrv. 34.1-8), condemning luxury
among women (the Lex Oppia was abolished by the Lex Valeria Fundania, 195
B.C., Lrv. 34.1-8); and the Lex Voconia (169 B.C., G. INsT. 2.226, 2.274), exclud-
ing women from being "instituted" as "heirs" by testators who were members of the
first-the wealthiest-class at the census. Significant legal provisions against women
in the early principate are the marriage legislation of Augustus (Lex Iulia de
maritandis ordinibus, 18 B.C., UE 13.1, Lex Papia Poppaea, 9 A.D., UE 16.1-2),
abridging women's capacity to take under wills unless they had given birth to
legitimate children, and the Senatusconsultum Velleianum (DIG. 16.1 ad senatus
consultum Velleianum) prohibiting women from making themselves collaterally
liable for the debts of others.
36. Domitius Ulpianus, born before 172 A.D. and killed in either 223 or 228 A.D.,
was a high official under Roman emperors of the Severan dynasty and the most
prolific legal writer of classical Roman law. TONY HONORA, Ui~mN 3, 7-8, 45, 46
(1982).
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sexum: dum feminas prohibet pro alis postulare. et ratio
quidem prohibendi, ne contra pudicitiam sexui congruentem alienis
causis se immisceant, ne virilibus officiisfungantur mulieres:
orgo vero introducta est a Carfania improbissima femina, quae
inverecundepostulans et magistratum inquietans causam dedit edicto.
37
Translation:
Next comes an edict against those who are not to make applications
on behalf of others. In this edict the praetor debarred on grounds
of sex and disability. He also blacklisted persons tainted with
disrepute.
On the ground of sex, now he forbids women to make
applications on behalf of others. The reason for this is to prevent
that they involve themselves in the cases of other people contrary
to the modesty in keeping with their sex-that women fulfill male
offices.
Originally, this was in fact brought about by a most disap-
proved woman-Carfania-who by brazenly making applications
and disturbing the magistrate gave rise to the edict .... 38
This text, drafted in approximately 210 A.D.,39 is a legal source40
that reflects the Roman law since the time of Carfania's example, which
occurred perhaps around 60 B.C.4' For the composition of his text, it
seems very likely that Ulpianus used prior legal material, probably the
writings of older jurists; here, however, he does not quote any sources.
4 2
37. DIG. 3.1.1.5 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum). The text, which is contained in the Digest of
Justinian, has an inscription: "Ulpianus libro sexto ad edictum." DIG. 3.1.1.5
(Ulpianus 6 ad edictum). (Translation: Ulpianus in the sixth book of commentaries
on the edict [of the praetor]). For a discussion of edictum, see supra note 27; for a
discussion of praetor, see supra note 26.
38. The paragraph divisions have been added by the author. The whole of DIG. 3.1.1.5
(Ulpianus 6 ad edictum) is a lengthy text; its second part, which reports an exemplum
on the disability of blindness, is omitted here.
39. For the dating of Ulpianus' text that contains Carfania's case, see HONORA, supra note
36, at 148.
40. The Roman jurists' legal opinions are regarded as legal sources like statutes and edicts.
See DIG. 1.1.7.pr (Papinianus 2 definitionum); G. INST. 1.2, 1.7.
41. This assumption is based on the fart that Carfania died in 48 B.C. See VL. Mx,
8.3.2; infia note 45.
42. HONORP, supra note 36, at 205-07. Reference to the authority of earlier Roman
jurists is an often-applied technique in Roman jurists' legal writing. HONOA, supra
note 36, at 207. For an analysis of Ulpianus' references to other Roman jurists, see
HONOmi, supra note 36, at 204-48.
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Although he might have shaped the material, Ulpianus presumably did
not alter the essential form and substance of the text but relied on
tradition and used what he found on Carfania's case in his juristic
predecessors' writings.
4 3
In addition to this legal source, the historian Valerius Maximus, who
wrote in the early first century A.D.,4" reports that Carfania had become
the primary example of a woman whose "shameless" conduct in court
vexed the magistrate. Valerius Maximus also reports that Carfania was
married to the senator Licinius Bucco and that she died in 48 B.C.
45
Approximately one hundred years later, the satirist Juvenal 6 mentions
43. For a discussion of the uniformity in style and the fundamental stability in substance
of classical Roman jurists' legal thinking, see, e.g., SCHULZ, RomN IEAL ScmNcE,
supra note 3, at 124-40.
44. The dates of Valerius Maximus' birth and death are unknown; he lived around 20
A.D. See THE OxroRD CLAssIcAL DIcaToARY 1106 (2d ed. 1970).
45. VA. MAx. 8.3.2. Valerius Maximus states:
C. Afrania vero, Licinii Bucconis senatoris uxorprompta ad lites contrahendas
pro se semper apudpraetorem verbafecit, non quod advocatis deficebatur, sed
quodinpudentia abundabat. Itaque inusitatisfuro latratibus adsidue tribunalia
exercendo muliebris calumniae notissimum exemplum evasit, adeo ut pro
crimine inprobisfeminarum moribus C. Afraniae nomen obiciatur. Prorogavit
autem spiritum suum ad C. Caesarem iterum P. Servilium consules: tale enim




In fact, the wife of the senator Licinius Bucco, C. Afrania, [a woman]
ready to take up lawsuits, always spoke before the praetor for herself, not
because she lacked advocates, but because she abounded in shamelessness.
And so by constantly harassing the tribunals with yappings unusual for the
forum, she became the best known example of female vexatious proceed-
ing-so much so that the name C. Afrania is used as a label for the offense
[made up] by women's disapproved habits. She (yet) prolonged her life up
to the consulships of C. Caesar-his second-and P. Servilius [48 B.C.]:
for certainly it must be recorded when such a monster died rather than
when it was born.
Valerius Maximus reports that this woman, whom we identify as Carfania, spoke
"pro se (for herself). VA. MAx. 8.3.2. (In the editions ofValerius Maximus, Carfania
is referred to as C. Afrania probably because of a transmittal mistake that occurred
during the copying of the manuscripts by hand. For a brief discussion of the
difference between the names "Carfania" and "C. Aftania," see RIcHARD A. BAuMAN,
WOMEN AND PoLmcs iN ANcimrr RoME 231 n.29 (1992)). The use of "pro se
probably does not mean that she litigated only on her own behalf, but rather seems
to emphasize that she acted by herself before the praetor, thus conducting business
that would normally have been the male advocates' domain.
46. Decimus Iunius Iuvenalis was born probably between 50 and 65 A.D. and died in
127 A.D. or later. See THE OxFoRD CLAssIcAL DIcnONARY 571-72 (2d ed. 1970).
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Carfania in a very short remark, pointing out that other people dress even
more indecently than she did."
The Roman material reveals the following three "neutral" facts about
Carfania: she was of senatorial rank, conducted legal business by herself
before the magistrate, and died in 48 B.C.4" Apart from this, there are
only emphatically negative remarks about her. Throughout the sources,
she is a target of disdain and ridicule. 9 Over a period of almost two
centuries, the repeated stereotype seems so narrow and defamatory that
it lacks credibility. The palpably hostile tone used by each of the Roman
writers gives rise to the suspicion that Carfania may in fact have been of
quite a different character.
Whatever the reality, it is obvious that Carfania became an instru-
mental part of a patriarchal strategy. The story of her notoriety50 suggests
that she served as a convenient scapegoat for the patriarchs when they felt
that women's activities in court were an increasing annoyance. They
successfully made her into a negative icon, and the patriarchal tradition
upheld this image for centuries. The way in which this exemplum51 was
fabricated and designed to work deserves a closer look.
B. Carfania's Case Reveals the Patriarchal Arsenal
The first sentence in Ulpianus' report of the edict associates the
female sex with disability and dishonesty,52 thus establishing the two
47. Iuv. 2.65-70. "Sed quid non facient ali, cum tu multicia sumas, Cretice, ethanc vestem
populo miranteperores in Proculas etPollittas?Ert moecha Fabulla, damnetur, ii vi: edam
Carfini Taem non sumet damnata togam." (Translation: But what won't other men
do, Creticus, when you put on thin garments and, as the people wonder at this
clothing, you speak against Procula and Politta [i.e., loose women]? Fabulla is an
adulteress; let Carfinia be condemned as well, if you'd like. The condemned [woman]
won't put on such a toga [as you wear].)
48. VAT- MAx. 8.3.2; see supra note 45.
49. See supra part I.B., rules 12 and 13.
50. Valerius Maximus identifies Carfania as the best-known example of a magistrate's
vexation by a woman---"muebris calumniae notissimum exemplum." VA.x MAX. 8.3.2;
see supra note 45.
51. Ulpianus refers not only to Carfania but to a number of cases that he considers
relevant for discussingpostulare. DIG. 3.1.1.5 (Olpianus 6 ad edictum). Ulpianus'
repeated use of the term exemplum in the part following Carfania's story makes dear
that each of those cases, including Carfania's case, is regarded as an exemplum: "exstat
quidem exemplum ... idque multis comprobatur exempis." DIG. 3.1.1.5 (Ulpianus 6
ad edictum).
52. At the beginning of his report, Ulpianus introduces the categories sex ("sexas"),
meaning women; disability ("cas); and persons noticeable for disrepute ("personas
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pillars on which the whole structure of discrimination rests. The under-
lying assumption of the structure is that women are either feeble or
vicious or both;5" therefore, women must be subject to different treat-
ment than men. Consistent with their view that women lack physical
strength, 54 the patriarchs represent women as weak in intellect and
character as well.55 The first weakness exposes women to men's protec-
tion, the second to men's correction.
Since correction is an effective means of exercising dominance, the
Roman patriarchs establish a correctional scheme by imposing a certain
ethos on women. This ethos pointedly identifies the female sex with
isolation and modesty56 and generally outlaws any behavior by women
that contradicts this code ("contrapudicitiam sexui congruentem").5 The
maxim of isolation condemns women to privacy; they may not ap-
proach other people (at least not without patriarchal control) or become
involved in others' affairs.5' The maxim of modesty renders women
inferior to men by defining women's fundamental disposition as not
claiming equality with men.
These two maxims are combined in the command that women
shall not assume male business. The constructed identification of the
female sex59 with privacy and modesty-pudicitia-has its counterpart
in turpitudine notabiles'). DIG. 3.1.1.5 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum). See supra text
accompanying notes 37-38.
53. See supra part I.B., rule 5.
54. For a modern discussion of physicality and its different meaning for men and
women, see CATHAmNE A. MACKcNNoN, Women, Self-Possession, and Sport, in
FmiNIsM UNMODIFIED, supra note 5, at 117-24.
55. For this line of argument in Roman legal sources, see Suzanne Dixon, Infirmitas
sexus: Womanly Weakness in Roman Law, LII TiJDSCHaFr VOOR RECHTS-
GESCHIEDENiS 343-71 (1984).
56. "Not being heard is not just a function of lack of recognition, not just that no one
knows how to listen to you, although it is that; it is also silence of the deep kind,
the silence of being prevented from having anything to say." MAcKn NoN, Differ-
ence, supra note 13, at 39.
57. DIG. 3.1.1.5 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum); see supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
Literally, pudor and pudicitia denote a sense or feeling of shame, a state of
submission, and chastity. (See, e.g., the various expressions formed of the Latin root
pud- in the OxoRD Lru DicrxoNARY 1513-14 (1982)). In more general terms,
the disposition of being ashamed and subdued stands for modesty, and chastity
implies isolation and privacy.
58. "Ne... alienis causis'se immisceant." DIG. 3.1.1.5 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum). See
supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
59. See supra part I.B., rule 7. The phrase "contra pudicitiam sexui congruentem," see
supra text accompanying note 57, reveals remarkable semantics: Ulpianus speaks of
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in the remarkably artificial notion of "male offices" (virilia officia).6
This approach monopolizes for men the domain of public and official
funcdons.
Roman patriarchy views public acts as such intrinsic parts of the
masculine gender that it calls them male offices, viilia officia.6 ' The
approach is general and abstract, because to describe these functions in
more specific terms than "male" would hamper the patriarchs' goal of
usurping public power positions as they wish. (In addition, their
supremacy benefits from the privilege to define a function as "male"
whenever desirable.) Thus, patriarchy establishes its exclusive access to
public power-and not incidentally. After all, the central institutions
and procedures of patriarchal dominance are at stake."2
The example of Carfania, which Ulpianus presents to conclude his
argument for women's restricted capacity in the courts, substantially
embodies the maxims of modesty and isolation. Primarily, Carfania is
marked as a woman who is utterly disapproved of ("Carfania
improbissimafemind').6 3 This expresses that she is completely ostracized
under the regime of pudicitia6' Her alleged conduct before the magis-
trate suggests a person devoid of decency. She is said to have behaved
brazenly ("inverecunde") when addressing the magistrate.
An important method of controlling the societal discourse is to
keep it free from certain persons, issues, or forms of articulation. Patri-
archy regards such methods as necessary to accomplish order and main-
tain peace. Yet, the patriarchal striving for order and peace is
problematically associated with silencing certain people.
a "sexus" to express that women are meant as addressees. Thus, he reifies the
concern and camouflages the aspect that those who are affected-women-are
persons.
60. Women shall not ftiflill male offices: "ne virilibus offlciis fungantur mulieres." DIG.
3.1.1.5 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum). See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
61. See supra part I.B., rule 4.
62. See supra part I.B., rule 3.
63. DIG. 3.1.1.5 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum). See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
See supra part I.B., rule 8.
64. For a discussion of pudicia, see supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. For
antique inscriptions about men's praise of women's virtues, see, e.g., LE'xowrTz &
FANT, supra note 7, at 16-21. An outstanding exemplum of Roman female virtues is
reported in the so-called "/audatio Turiar," a fimerary speech of the late first
century B.C. 3 FoNrs lums RomlxI ANTEjusTINANi 209-18 (Vincentius
Arangio-Ruiz ed., 2d ed. 1972). See also infia note 248.
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Since Carfania has caused inquietude to the magistrate
("magistratum inquietan"),6 5 who symbolizes the male regime, she must
be silenced.6 The patriarchs exercise an act of silencing when they
introduce the new prohibition. 7 They use Carfania as an example
because her lack of pudicitia is likely to arouse some latent misogynous
feelings, provoking a patriarchal call for a general restrictive measure.
Thus, they silence all women by introducing the new edict prohibiting
women from acting in court for others.
The jurist Ulpianus gives no hint that Carfania broke the law; he
probably would have done so if she had." Her conduct was indeed
significant, but not because she neglected the formalities of civil proce-
dure. Apparently she complied with the procedural rules, but asserted
her rights with vigorous tenacity. Her assertive posture seems to have
constituted the fatal provocation of the magistrate. Carfania disregarded
the societal norms that required her either to surrender herself to the
magistrate's mercy and paternalistic guidance69 or to have a male advo-
cate act in her stead.70
65. DIG. 3.1.1.5 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum). See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
66. "Women have been silenced as women: we have been told ... that women can't
speak the language of significance .... " CATHARINE A. MAcKiNNoN, Desire and
Power, in FmanNisM UNMODIFIED, supra note 5, at 56-57 [hereinafter MAcKmNON,
Desire].
67. Apart from his report on Carfania, Valerius Maximus tells us in his chapter 8.3,
entitled "Quae mulieres apud magistratus pro se aut pro aliis causas egerunt," VA.
Max. 8.3 (Translation: Women who pleaded cases before magistrates for themselves
or for others), about two other women acting before the magistrates: Maesia
Sentinas, VAL. MAx. 8.3.1, and Hortensia, VAT. MAx. 8.3.3. In an introductory
phrase, Valerius Maximus explains his leitmotif for presenting the reports on Maesia
Sentinas, Carfania, and Hortensia: not to be silent about women who have unduly
broken their silence. "Ne de iis quidem feminis tacendum est, quas condicio naturae et
verecundia stolae ut in Joro et iudiciis tacerent cohibere non valuit." VAL MAx. 8.3.
(Translation: One also should not be silent about those women whose natural
condition and the modesty of the woman's cloak could not confine them to being
silent in the forum and court.)
68. Valerius Maximus speaks of her crime (crimen) but quite probably not in a techni-
cal legal sense. VAL,. MAx. 8.3.2; see supra note 45. Juvenal refers to her as
"Carfnia... damnata," Iuv. 2.65-70, see supra note 47; but since Juvenal writes
as a satirist, and a satire is made by ironical distortions and exaggerations, his phrase
"Carfinia ... damnatd' neither proves that she was condemned for her reported
vexing of the magistrate nor that she was convicted on another occasion.
69. When Carfania exercised her legal liberties regardless of contrary societal expecta-
tions (pudicitia), this was felt as a critical approach to patriarchy and evoked patriar-
chal opposition. See supra part I.B., rule 9.
70. VArL. MAx. 8.3.2; see supra note 45.
1995]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
The exemplum" of Carfania is an illuminating drama. It first
arouses Roman men's fears that women might achieve some autono-
mous position in the gender discourse by stylizing Carfania as a mon-
ster.72 The exemplum then relieves their fears by defeating Carfania
herself and, at the same time, by eliminating the danger of such mon-
sters arising in the future.
This example is intentionally biased. The patriarchs apparently
devised such a massive strategy because their abridgement of women's
litigation rights was difficult to justify in terms of legal doctrine and
legal structure. The magistrate had the right to sanction any contempt
of court. Thus, the women's alleged disrespectful behavior in court
would not be the true reason for the particular measure. 73
The example of Carfania works by way of distortion.74 It invents
an urgent need to exclude women from certain litigation rights and
ignores the structural inconsistency of this specific provision in the
general legal framework." The example also camouflages the patriarchs'
underlying purpose, which is to gain or regain control of the litigation
process.76 They achieve this by depriving women of some litigation
rights and annexing those rights to the male hemisphere. 77
III. CARFANIAN EXAMPLES IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY: SUFFRAGE
Although women's suffrage might at first seem to be a deviation
from our focus on women in the courts, there are good reasons for
entering this excursus. Suffrage is a central civil right. It indicates the
fundamental acceptance of a person as a citizen. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the right to vote will lead to the acquisition of other civil
71. For the nature of example in the normative discourse, see supra part I.C.
72. Valerius Maximus calls her a monstrum. Vi.. MAX. 8.3.2; see supra note 45.
73. The magistrates had the legal power to take coercive and repressive measures in
order to execute their commands and to punish minor disorderly offenses. This
aspect of the magistrates' administration was called coercido. See CIC. LEG. 3.6
("coherceto"); Kummi, supra note 3, at 15.
74. See supra part I.B., rule 9.
75. See supra part I.B., rule 6.
76. For the strategic advantages of examples as instruments in the normative discourse,
see supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
77. For the discussion of the virilia officia, see supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
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rights and liberties not yet achieved,7 including full access to courts.
Women's suffrage helped expand and unify the civil rights of
women that previously existed only in a patchwork pattern across the
different states. 7 For example, Delaware and Rhode Island admitted
women to the bar only after the Nineteenth Amendment made wom-
en's suffrage a part of the U.S. Constitution in 1920.80 Moreover, as an
issue of outstanding real and symbolic significance in terms of power,
women's suffrage caused some of the most impassioned discussions of
gender in American politics.
A. Suffrage and Women as Citizens
At the time of the American Revolution, women's suffrage became
a repeatedly discussed issue.81 Abigail Adams' famous request to her
husband, "Remember the Ladies,"82 alludes to it. John Adams,
78. "Unfortunately, full rights of citizenship for women as women were not a major
theoretical concern of progressive female activists at the turn of the century. They
simply assumed it would somehow result from suffrage." HoFF, supra note 4, at 18.
79. For the history of women's suffrage in the United States, see, e.g., BEVRLY
BEErON, WOMEN VoTE IN THE Wsr: THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MovRmraNr,
1869-1896 (1986); STEVEN M. BUECHLER, WOMEN's MovwmENrs IN THE UNITED
STATEs (1990); RuTH BARNES MoYNimH , REBEL FOR RIGHTS: ABIGAIL SCOTT
D NrwAY (1983).
80. HOFF, supra note 4, at 164.
81. Roman women were not permitted to vote. Any influence they had on elections
was political, not legal. The remnants of ancient Pompeii provide evidence of such
political activities; there are graffiti revealing the names of women who expressed
their appraisal and support for certain candidates in the community's elections. See,
e.g., LEFKowITz & FAurr, supra note 7, at 152-53; WOLFGANG SCHULLER, FRAUEN
IN DER R6MISCHEN GEsCHicHTE 24 (1987); Liisa Savunen, Women and Elections in
Pompeii, in WOMEN IN ArnQurrT: NEw AssassMEmNs 194 (Richard Hawley &
Barbara Levick eds., 1995). For a discussion of Roman women's political influence,
see generally BAUMAN, supra note 45.
82. HOFF, supra note 4, at 60. Abigail Adams wrote to her husband:
I long to hear that you have declared an independancy-and by the way
in the new Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to
make I desire you would Remember the Ladies, and be more generous
and favourable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited
power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be
tyrants if they could. If perticular care and attention is not paid to the
Laidies we are determined to foment a Rebelion, and will not hold our-
selves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or Representation.
Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776) in HoFF, supra note 4,
at 60 (quoting 1 ADAMs FAMILY CORRESPONDENcE 370 (L. H. Butterfield & Marc
Friedlander eds., 1963)).
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writing to his colleague James Sullivan, however, emphatically rejects
the idea:
But why exclude Women? You will Say, because their Delicacy
renders them unfit for Practice and Experience, in the great
Businesses of Life, and the hardy Enterprises of War, as well as the
arduous Cares of State. Besides, their attention is so much engaged
with the necessary Nurture of their Children, that Nature has made
them fittest for domestic Cares... Depend upon it, Sir, it is
dangerous to open so fruitfull a Source of Controversy and alterca-
tion; as would be opened by attempting to alter the Qualifications
of Voters. There will be no End of it. New Claims will arise.
Women will demand a Vote. Lads from 12 to 21 will think their
Rights not enough attended to, and every Man, who has not a
Farthing, will demand an equal Voice with any other in all Acts of
State. It tends to confound and destroy all Distinctions, and
prostrate all Ranks, to one common Levell. 3
Adams operates with the separate spheres conception of men as
breadwinners, soldiers, and statesmen and women as homemakers and
mothers.8 4 The true vocation of women, established by nature, is bear-
ing and nurturing children. 5 Apart from that, women are handicapped
by their "delicacy" (a romantic expression for weakness)86 and banished
from public interactions in the economy, politics, and the law. Thus,
men establish their own competence, representing themselves as devoted
priests of public affairs, committed to "great Businesses," "hardy Enter-
prises," and "arduous Cares." The possibility of a change in this
metaphysically rooted order evokes in Adams' mind a scenario of apoca-
lyptic horror H-the loss of peace and hierarchy, leading to a state of
devastating equality ("to one common Levell")."9
After the Civil War, women's claim to suffrage drew strength from
two new developments: state legislation concerning women's capacity to
hold property and the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. At common law, married women
83. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776) in 4 LETrERS oil DELE-
GATES TO CONGPRSS 72-75 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1979).
84. See supra part I.B., rule 5.
85. See supra part I.B., rule 7.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
87. See supra part I.B., rule 2.
88. See supra part I.B., rule 5.
89. See supra part I.B., rule 1.
[Vol. 3:195
WOMEN IN THE COURTS
were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property; they were
even regarded as legally incapable of entering into contracts. 90
Blackstone's explanation for this is that "[b]y marriage, the husband and
wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of
the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protec-
tion, and cover, she performs every thing.....,91
Although there were court decisions and state legislation
concerning married women's property rights throughout the nineteenth
century, 92 it was only in the second half of the nineteenth century,
particularly after the Civil War, that these rights were systematically
established. At that time, the change was one of principle, with a large-
scale effect.93 Prior to this, only those women who had escaped
guardianship or marriage could directly and actively participate in
legally acknowledged economic transactions and positions.94
Enjoying property rights subjected women to taxation. In the
American conscience, taxation implies representation and, therefore,
being taxed gave women a substantial argument for representation not
mediated by their husbands. 9' Moreover, in terms of demographics, the
90. For a discussion of this tradition at common law and its exceptions in equity, see
John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law
School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality 47 N.Y.U. L Rav. 1033,
1044-57 (1972).
91. 1 WmLaAm BLACKSrONE, COMMENTIARS *442 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
92. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 90, at 1057-70.
93. See, e.g., LAwRENcE M. FRIEDMAN, A HisvoRY oF Amu cAN LAw 495-96 (2d ed.
1985); HOFF, supra note 4, at 127-34, 377-82.
94. As an exception to these rigidities at common law, equity procedures enabled
women to enjoy certain property interests. From a general perspective, however,
those equitable or beneficial property rights were of minor importance for two
reasons: they were designed for the upper class, and they conferred only limited
options to enjoy and to dispose of property. For a historical discussion of women's
property rights in equity, see HOFF, supra note 4, at 124-27.
95. Elizabeth Cady Stanton (a leading member of the American women's suffrage
movement in the second half of the nineteenth century) explains that the constitu-
tional ideals of the American Revolution turned into tyranny when certain groups
were taxed but denied the right to vote. She insists, "[olur Fathers... denied the
elective franchise to men without property and education, to clergymen, women
and negroes. They declared taxation without representation tyranny, then taxed all
these dis-enfranchised classes." HoFF, supra note 4, at 145 (quoting ANDREW
SINCLAIR, THE BETrER HALF: THE EMANCIPATION OF THE AMERICAN WoMAN 185
(1965)). For a discussion of property as a qualification for voting in the American
states (except Vermont), see WiLm P. ADAMs, THE FiRsT AMERiCAN CONsTrru-
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argument rested on a broad base because many women had become
taxpayers or potential taxpayers. 96
Similarly, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Con-
stitution (ratified in 1868 and 1870 respectively), both designed to
empower the African-American male population, could also have been
read as enfranchising women. Section One of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is broad and bold in its proclamation: "All persons born or natu-
ralized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States .... 97 Section Two,
however, prescribes the reduction of a state's representation only when
the right to vote is "denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States .... ,98 The Fifteenth Amendment specifically determines that
"citizens" -of the United States shall not be denied the right to vote
because of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
99
The argument that the amendments gave women the right to vote
was, however, rejected in United States v. Anthony."'0 Susan B. Anthony
registered to vote in Rochester, New York; took part in an election by
casting a ballot'on November 5, 1872; and was then subjected to
criminal prosecution. She was charged with violating the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1870, in particular a provision that sanctioned electoral
fraud where a voter cast more than one ballot. This provision was
TIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONsrITUTIONS IN
THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 193-217 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 1980).
96. For statistics demonstrating the extent to which women's legal capacity concerning
property rights was enhanced in the nineteenth century, see HOFF, supra note 4, at
129, 377-82.
In one of her arguments for women's suffrage, Susan B. Anthony characterizes
women as taxpayers not different from men when she speaks of "women of the
entire nation, vast numbers of whom are the peers of those honorable gentlemen
themselves, in morals, intellect, culture, wealth, family-paying taxes on large
estates, and contributing equally with them and their sex, in every direction, to the
growth, prosperity, and well-being of the Republic." HoFF, supra note 4, at 154
(quoting 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 639-40 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan
B. Anthony, and Mathilda J. Gage eds., 1881, repr. 1970)).
97. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
98. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 2.
99. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1.
100. 24 E Cas. 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459).
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applied to her on the assumption that she had no right to vote at all.'t°
Anthony expressed her uncompromising criticism of male dominance in
a large, well-publicized campaign for women's rights of which her
voting was a part.
10 2
During her trial, Anthony challenged her prosecution as procedur-
ally unfair because she was not being tried by her peers. The judge
rejected this argument and ordered her to be silent.
103
Judge Hunt: The Court must insist-the prisoner has been tried
according to the established forms of law.
Miss Anthony: Yes, your honor, but by forms of law all made by
men, interpreted by men, administered by men, in favor of men,
and against women; and hence, your honor's ordered verdict of
guilty, against a United States citizen for the exercise of, "that
citizen's right to vote", simply because that citizen was a woman
and not a man.... As then the slaves who got their freedom
must take it over, or under, or through the unjust forms of law,
precisely so now must women, to get their right to a voice in this
Government, take it; and I have taken mine, and mean to take it
at every possible opportunity.
Judge Hunt: The Court orders the prisoner to sit down. It will
not allow another word.1
0 4
Anthony's perspective differs remarkably from that of her attorney,
Henry R. Seldon. In contrast to Anthony, Seldon obviously makes a
great effort to reconcile his client's claim with the traditional view of
gender:
On the one hand it is supposed by some that the character of
women would be radically changed-that they would be unsexed,
as it were, by clothing them with political rights, and that instead
of modest, amiable and graceful beings, we should have bold,
noisy, and disgusting political demagogues, or something worse, if
anything worse can be imagined. I think those who entertain
such opinions are in error....
101. See HoFF, supra note 4, at 153, 156-57, 160.
102. See HoFF, supra note 4, at 152-57.
103. See supra part I.B., rule 13. "When a woman speaks for herself, her violation be-
comes an atrocity and is therefore a lie." MAcKnnoN, Art, supra note 8, at 11.
104. HOFF, supra note 4, at 159 (quoting 2 HisToRY oF WoMES SUFFRAGE 687-88
(Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Mathilda J. Gage eds., 1881, repr.
1970)).
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So far as women, without change of character as women, are
qualified to discharge the duties of citizenship, they will discharge
them if called upon to do so, and beyond that they will not go.
Nature has put barriers in the way of any excessive devotion of
women to public affairs, and it is not necessary that nature's work
in that respect should be supplemented by additional barriers
invented by men. Such offices as women are qualified to fill will
be sought by those who do not find other employment, and
others they will not seek, or if they do, will seek in vain.
10 5
Seldon, a pragmatist, tries to alleviate men's fears. His argument
dearly subscribes to the conventional rejection of women's serious
participation in official power structures when he speaks of "disgusting
political demagogues."" 6 Seldon, like the Roman patriarchs and John
Adams before him, identifies the feminine gender with the private
sphere. He assumes that modesty is women's fundamental attitude07
and that providing for men's enchantment is one of women's most
important functions.
108
Seldon develops a rhetorical strategy to minimize the possible
consequences of allowing women's suffrage.' 09 He characterizes women's
nature as being little devoted to public affairs."0 Asserting that their
105. HOFF, supra note 4, at 158 (quoting 2 HisTORY op WOMEN SUFFRAGE 660-61
(Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Mathilda J. Gage eds., 1881, repr.
1970)).
106. HOFF, supra note 4, at 158.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
108. The ability to enchant men is, of course, turned against women. For example, in
1869, Belva A. Lockwood applied to the Law Department of Columbian College in
Washington. The rejection letter from the President, George W. Samson, reads as
follows:
Madam, the Faculty of Columbian College have considered your request
to be admitted to the Law Department of this institution and after due
consultation, have considered that such admission would not be expedient
as it would be likely to distract the attention of the young men.
Letter from George W. Samson to Belva A. Lockwood (Oct. 7, 1869) in Monnao,
supra note 4, at 71.
109. This becomes particularly obvious in Seldon's argument preceding his explanation
of women's nature: "So far as women, without change of character as women, are
qualified to discharge the duties of citizenship, they will discharge them if called
upon to do so, and beyond that they will not go." HoFF, supra note 4, at 158
(quoting 2 His'rony op WMAN SuFFRAGE 660-61 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan
B. Anthony, and Mathilda J. Gage eds., 1881, repr. 1970)).
110. See supra part I.B., rule 7.
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nature bars further ambitions, he advocates women's suffrage."' Finally,
he implies that if women sought to go further there would be means to
detain them. However, Seldon's efforts to calm patriarchal fears did not
succeed. The court held that women had no right to vote, and Anthony
was convicted under the Civil Rights Act of 1870 for having acted
"'against the peace of the United States of America and their
dignity. ' ' 12
The application of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
became a gender issue before the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Minor v. Happersett." Again, women's suffrage was denied. The
Court took an approach similar to that of Judge Hunt in United States
v. Anthony"' by interpreting the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
as having no impact upon the states' abilities to restrict suffrage to
males.
The opinion in Minor v. Happersett is technical and devoid of
references to traditional gender stereotypes."' It is based mainly on four
assumptions. First, the Constitution uses the word "citizen" as an
expedient expression for people belonging to the nation of the United
States, but not as a legal concept implying rights or liberties." 6 Second,
111. See supra part I.B., rule 8.
112. HoFp, supra note 4, at 157 (quoting the opening statement of the U.S. District
Attorney, Richard Crowley).
113. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). Shortly before Minor v. Happersett, the Court
developed, in the decision of the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872), an interpretation that restricted the applicability of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment almost exclusively to racial discrimination. See GoLDsTEIN, supra note 4, at
3-8.
114. 24 R Cas. 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459).
115. The following are MacKinnon's observations on forms of legal discourse that seem
to be ungendered: "Two things happen: law becomes legitimate, and social domi-
nance becomes invisible. Liberal legalism is thus a medium for making male domi-
nance both invisible and legitimate by adopting the male point of view in law at the
same time as it enforces that view on society." MAcKmNoN, STATE, supra note 5, at
237. "Gender neutrality is thus simply the male standard .... " MAcKImNON,
Difference, supra note 13, at 34. See also infra note 123.
116. "There is no doubt that women may be citizens." Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 165.
Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed
by the association.... For convenience it has been found necessary to give
a name to this membership. The object is to designate by a tide the person
and the relation he bears to the nation. For this purpose the words "sub-
ject," "inhabitant," and "citizen" have been used.... When used in this
sense it [citizen] is understood as conveying the idea of membership of a
nation, and nothing more.
Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 166.
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the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments did not change this mean-
ing of "citizen."" 7 Third, the Constitution is an agreement of the states
that can only comprehend and reflect the constitutional law of the
states at the time that the federal Constitution was made."' At that
time, each state constitution restricted suffrage to certain groups of
citizens, and only in New Jersey were women made voters." 9 Fourth,
the Supreme Court's competence is confined to ascertaining existing
law; it does not create new law." °
117. "The [Fourteenth] amendment did not add to the privileges and immunities of a
citizen. It simply furnished an additional guaranty for the protection of such as he
already had." Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 171.
And still again, after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, it was
deemed necessary to adopt a fifteenth, as follows: "The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." The fourteenth amendment had already provided that no State
should make or enforce any law which should abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States. If suffrage was one of these
privileges or immunities, why amend the Constitution to prevent its being
denied on account of race, &c.? [sic] Nothing is more evident than that the
greater must include the less, and if all were already protected why go
through with the form of amending the Constitution to protect a part?
Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 175.
118. "The Constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens. For
that definition we must look elsewhere.... The United States has no voters in the
States of its own creation. The elective officers of the United States are all elected
directly or indirectly by State voters." Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 170. "This
makes it proper to inquire whether suffrage was coextensive with the citizenship of
the States at the time of [the Constitution's] adoption." Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
at 171.
119. "When the Federal Constitution was adopted, all the States, with the exception of
Rhode Island and Connecticut, had constitutions of their own.... Upon an
examination of those constitutions we find that in no State were all citizens permit-
ted to vote." Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 172. "As has been seen, all the citizens
of the States were not invested with the right of suffrage. In all, save perhaps New
Jersey, this right was only bestowed upon men and not upon all of them." Minor,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 176.
120. The Court explains:
If the law is wrong, it ought to be changed; but the power for that is not
with us. The arguments addressed to us bearing upon such a view of the
subject may perhaps be sufficient to induce those having the power, to
make the alteration, but they ought not to be permitted to influence our
judgment in determining the present rights of the parties now litigating
before us.
Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 178.
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The final argument, which regards women's suffrage as an issue
beyond the reach of the Court, sounds almost apologetic;'.' however,
by this approach, the Court avoids a material discussion of women's
suffrage.' The exclusion of women from the voting booth is thus
achieved by a shining example of liberal legalism.' Leaving out any
reference to gender concepts gives the appearance of fairness and legalis-
tic consistency. 2 4 Yet, the Court's highly selective and strangely static
style of legal thinking actually succeeds in manipulating the gender
issue.
B. A Carfanian Experience in New Jersey, 1807
In an isolated phenomenon in American legal history, the New
Jersey Constitution of 1776 established women's suffrage. In 1807,
however, this right was abolished, and suffrage was restricted to white
men. 125 Although the information given by the sources is not sufficient
to exclude ambiguity, 2 6 we know enough about the historic context to
comment on three aspects of this phenomenon: the situation that gave
rise to suffrage for women in 1776, the probable reasons for its abolish-
ment in 1807, and the tactics used to achieve its abolishment.
The late eighteenth century was an age of epochal changes. The
philosophy of enlightenment substituted a new concept of the person
121. The Court states:
No argument as to woman's need of suffrage can be considered. We can
only act upon her rights as they exist. It is not for us to look at the
hardship of withholding. Our duty is at an end if we find it is within the
power of a State to withhold.
Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 178.
122. See supra part I.B., rule 3.
123. Maclinnon describes the patriarchal background of liberal legalism:
We notice in language as well as in life that the male occupies both the
neutral and the male position. This is another way of saying that the
neutrality of objectivity and of maleness are coextensive linguistically,
whereas women occupy the marked, the gendered, the different, the
forever-female position.
MACKwNON, Desire, supra note 66, at 55. See also MAcKnNON, STATE, supra note
5, at 162-67. See also supra note 115.
124. See supra part I.B., rule 4.
125. Hopp, supra note 4, at 98-103.
126. GoiDsmn'i, supra note 4, at 75; HOF, supra note 4, at 98.
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for the outworn feudalistic structures.12 7 This new idea of the person
focused on equal autonomy and dignity as every individual's fundamen-
tal innate rights. These rights were to be perceived as prior and superior
to the regimes of law and state. In theory, this concept rested on the
primary assumption that the person is endowed with property.'
This philosophical approach nurtured two societal systems that
remain of great importance today. First, it created the modern state as
an egalitarian democracy committed to the civil rights of the individu-
al. 2 9 Second, it formed the basis of the bourgeois civil society, which
arrived at its climax in the nineteenth century but is still alive in many
traditions today.
In the initial phase of an enlightened movement, the intellectual
and political climate is connected with more generous rules of dis-
course. 3 There is apparently less intimidation, control, and censorship
of ideas. In such times of change, women seem to participate more
freely in the societal discourse than in more settled or more conservative
periods,' 3' although the success of their ideas may still be frustrated by
their male contemporaries.
32
127. See generally IMMANUEL KA'r, DIE META'HYSIK DER SITTEN (1797), translated in
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPvSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
128. On the basis of this assumption, the concept of contract becomes the paradigmatic
form of interaction in equality. See, e.g., PATRICK SEuM ATIYAH, THE RISE AND
FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNrAacT 36-60, 69-85 (1979). For a discussion of
property dauses in the first American state constitutions, see, e.g., ADAMs, tupra
note 95, at 193-217.
129. See, e.g., KEMrr L HAn. THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY 49-66
(1989).
130. This is also true for the later Roman republic, when the Roman mind was influ-
enced by ideas of Greek philosophy. For a general survey of the intellectual life in
Rome of that period, see RAwsoN, supra note 32, at 3-114. In her condusion,
Rawson states that "[t]he Ciceronian age was one in which considerable intellectual
liberty prevailed .... ." RAwsoN, supra note 32, at 322. "Rome was not to recover
under the Empire the sense of intellectual excitement and achievement that she
knew in the period of the collapse of the Republic." RxwsoN, supra note 32, at
325.
The Greek influence produced a discussion of the traditional Roman virtues
and values in a way that reflected the anthropocentric focus that had dominated
Greek philosophy since Socrates. This becomes most obvious in the later Roman
republic's discussion of society, state, and politics. See generally NEA. WOOD,
CICERO'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL. THOUGHT (1988). In legal discourse, Greek
philosophy probably inspired enlightened ideas such as personal freedom and
individualism. See SCHULZ, RoMAN LEGAL SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 84.
131. See, e.g., LINDA K KEPRER, WOMm OF THE REPUBLIC (1980).
132. For example, Abigail Adams' husband had a negative reaction to her views. See
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The late eighteenth-century enlightenment had an ethos and even
a pathos of radical equality based on its concept of the person.'33 Some-
times this concept did not remain programmatic but gained entry into
the law'34 and even into constitutions. 3 5 This seems to have happened
in New Jersey in 1776.36
The rules of power typical for a rapidly growing society in the
process of industrialization soon overcame the spirit of this enlightened
egalitarianism.' 37 Society's focus shifted from eliminating feudalistic or
imperialistic dominance to organizing the new economic potential in
terms of power. In politics, the struggle for personal freedom and
national independence made way for the concern with distribution of
economic means and profits. 3 '
The political dynamic thus succumbed to the logic of the capitalist
market. This economic system paralyzed the idea of political and legal
equality, because capitalism tends to foster elite competition that pro-
duces accumulations of wealth and power. Hence a societal climate
supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. Moreover, a legal feminist of the French
Revolution, Olympe de Gouges, was beheaded in 1793 for asserting radical feminist
propositions concerning the law and the state. See Joan Wallach Scott, A Woman
Who Has Only Paradoxes to Offer: Olympe de Gouges Claims Rights for Women, in
REBEL DAUGHTERS 102, 106-16 (Sara E. Melzer & Leslie W. Rabine eds., 1992).
For a discussion of recent successful patriarchal strategies against women's liberation,
see, e.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN
WOMEN (1991).
133. This ethos is primarily expressed in claims for liberty, equality, independence, civil
rights, democracy, and division of powers. See, for example, the American constitu-
tional enactments of that period, such as THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(U.S.) 1776; MASS. CONST. of 1780; NJ. CONST. of 1776; VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of
1776. See generally ROBERT A. RUTAD, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1955).
134. In New Jersey, the Quakers' liberal attitude toward women seems to have
contributed to the enfranchisement of women in New Jersey's 1776 constitution.
See Hopp, supra note 4, at 98-99.
135. For a discussion of "equality" in the first American constitutions, see, e.g., ADAMs,
supra note 95, at 164-76.
136. The gender-neutral language of the other constitutional enactments of that period
gave only lip service to the idea of equality. Those legal terms were subsequently
interpreted in a patriarchal manner, thus excluding women's suffrage. Cf HOFF,
supra note 4, at 117-18 (maintaining that the constitutional enactments deliberately
omitted references to women).
137. This new economic development is reflected, for example, in the rise of the business
corporation. See FRmDMAN, supra note 93, at 188-201.
138. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 129, at 67-128.
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ensued that likely contributed to the abolishment of women's suffrage
in New Jersey.
139
In this setting, men simply needed an expedient example, such as
that of Carfania, to render women's suffrage scandalous."' The occa-
sion was found in an election in 1807, which was regarded as tainted
because more women appeared to vote than were registered. There are
two explanations for this surplus of women voters. One is that some
women reappeared in changed outfits and cast a second ballot. The
other version maintains that some men disguised themselves as women
and cast extra ballots."'
Whatever happened, the officials in charge of the election appar-
ently escaped blame. Although the fraud may have resulted from poor
organization or from misrepresentation by male voters, women were
once again used as scapegoats."' If men did in fact disguise themselves
as women, then the exclusion of all New Jersey women from voting is
particularly perfidious.1 3 Furthermore, this raises the question of
whether men took part in the election disguised as women solely to
produce a scandal that could be used as an example to defame women
and abolish their suffrage.144
IV. CARFANIAN EXAMPLES IN UNITED STATES HISTORY:
RESISTANCE TO WOMEN AT THE BAR AND
IN THE JURY Box
History has disproved the aspiration that constitutions proclaiming
democratic principles and equal privileges and immunities to all citizens
would result in women's equal participation in official functions.
Women's suffrage had to be fought for specifically, and, once achieved,
139. For an illustration of how the political dimate changed around 1800 in New Jersey
and became increasingly biased against women's suffrage, see Hov, supra note 4, at
100-101.
140. See supra parts II.A. and II.B.
141. GoLDSTmN, supra note 4, at 75; Hopp, supra note 4, at 102.
142. In language similar to that found in Ulpianus' account of Carfania's case (see supra
text accompanying notes 37-38), the preamble of the New Jersey statute abolishing
women's suffrage explained the new provision as "highly necessary to the safety,
quiet, good order and dignity of the state." Hopp, supra note 4, at 102 (quoting
Edward R. Turner, Women's Suffiage in New Jersey, xgpo-HO7, in I SMrrH COLLEGE
STUDIES IN HisToRY 184-85 (July 1916)).
143. See supra part I.B., rules 9 and 11.
144. See supra part I.B., rules 12 and 13.
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did not automatically guarantee women access to the public domain.
Thus, women's fight for participation in official court functions
remained fragmented and reproduced experiences similar to Carfania's
defeat.
A. A Carfanian Claim: Women's Access to the Bar
Carfania's example led to the legal exclusion of Roman women
from the role of advocate in court. 145 It is difficult to assess the effects
of this exclusion on legal practice because there is no ancient Roman
source that tells us about women as professional advocates. However,
since Roman upper-class women of the first century B.C. regularly
evaded strict subordination to male family power 146 or male guardian-
ship, 147 they could freely enjoy property rights and did in fact own large
estates. Administering their affairs seems likely to have necessitated their
145. See supra parts II.A and II.B.
146. Patria potestas was the paternal power of the head of the Roman family, who was
called paterfamilias, over his legitimate offspring. As a rule, the children (and their
children, etc.) under patria potestas had an extremely restricted capacity in private
law until their pater familias died (or when the father, during his lifetime, released
the child from his potestas by granting the emancipatio). Persons not under paternal
power were called sui iuris. In marriage, a woman could be subjected to her hus-
band's family power. She was then in his manus, a legal status very similar to the
children's in patria potestas. In the later Roman republic it seems to have been an
upper-class rule that on the occasion of the daughter's marriage the pater familias
made her sui iuris by performing the legal act of emancipatio, and no manus by her
husband was established. See GARDNER, supra note 7, at 5-14.
147. On account of her sex, a Roman woman sui iuris, see supra note 146, was under a
specific guardianship, called tute/a mulierum (translation: women's guardianship). As
a rule, the law attributed the function of a woman's guardian to her closest male
relative, for example, to her father (in the case of emancipatio), uncle, brother, or
even her son. Apart from that, there were ways to appoint a man who did not
belong to her family-for instance, her husband-as her tutor mulieris (translation:
guardian of the woman).
The tutela mulierum was originally designed to control women's major transac-
tions. However, there is considerable evidence that during the later Roman republic
and after, this guardianship was not very cumbersome for Roman upper-class
women. For example, in the eyes of the law, the tutor mulieris was considered to be
of so little importance that the woman could not make him accountable for his
conduct as guardian. Furthermore, in certain cases the woman could choose who
she wanted appointed as her guardian, or she was given a legal remedy to attain her
guardian's authorization of a transaction she wanted to make. In fact, quite often
the women seem to have evaded tutea mulierum completely by treating it as a
negligible legal formality. See GARDNER, supra note 7, at 14-22,
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appearance in court.'48 Considering that such women were at the top of
social hierarchies, it seems plausible that they found themselves in a
position to litigate on behalf of others.
149
Just as Carfania emerged from Rome prior to the Roman Revolution
that turned the republic into the principate, 15 Margaret Brent, a famous
lawyer and litigator, emerged from prerevolutionary America. Brent, an
English aristocrat, settled in St. Mary's Parish, Maryland, in 1638 and
acquired extensive real estate holdings. She was appointed counsel to the
governor, Leonard Calvert, and became executor of his estate in 1647.2
Brent's example reveals that owning and administering a large
complex of property, particularly real estate, leads to participation in the
public domain. 52 Such administration requires some active involvement
in institutional public power. Thus, it is apt to increase the prospects of
holding office. 153 Court records mention Margaret Brent in 124 court
148. The report of Valerius Maximus on Maesia Sentinas, VL. MAX. 8.3.1, and
Hortensia, VAL. MAx. 8.3.3, supports this assumption. Neither, however, provides
much information about women's advocacy functions. Maesia Sentinas, defending
herself, acts only on her own behalf. Hortensia does speak for other women
("causamfiminarum ... egit") when she fights the heavy tax imposed upon the class
of Roman matrons; however, she seems to be the matrons' voice in a political sense
rather than their litigator in a technical sense. For a discussion of the scarce material
on women in law in the Roman republic, see BAuMAN, supra note 45, at 45-52.
149. Not every Roman court appearance would have required a professionally trained
advocate. Laymen, and probably also laywomen, conducted proceedings that were
without complicated legal technicalities. For example, the Roman legal sources cite
a variety of instances when a person goes to court and acts on behalf of an absent
friend (negotiorum gestio) who would otherwise face a judgment on default (absem
indefensus). See, e.g., DIG. 3.5.1 (Ulpianus 10 ad edictum provinciale).
150. See, e.g., RONALD SYME, THE RomAN REvoLuTIoN (1939).
151. See ANToN-HERMANN CHROUST, 1 THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION rN AMPRiCA
49 (1965); see also MoRELLo, supra note 4, at 3-5.
152. The evidence of women pleading in court prior to 1869 shows mostly issues of
property and estate settlements. MonELLo, supra note 4, at 8.
153. Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that Margaret Brent's unique career may be
explained in part by English aristocratic legal structures that did not survive in the
United States. The traditional feudal hierarchy provided for feudal overlords to
administer some local jurisdictions. This function was understood to be one of the
various tights vested in the person who held property in an upper rank of the feudal
hierarchy. Being an English aristocrat, Brent presumedly enjoyed some distinguished
education, perhaps including some training for the practical administration of
property. Such a background might explain why she was familiar with these legal
functions when she moved to Maryland. For a discussion of local jurisdictions
connected with feudal land law, see generally JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY
JUDGES 208-64 (1960); A. K R. KMP ALF, PoTrER's His'romcA INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LAw AND ITS INsarm ONS 97-103 (4th ed. 1958).
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cases from 1642 to 1650.' A highly successful and respected negotiator
and litigator, Brent attempted to step further into the public domain. As
attorney for the governor, she demanded a vote and a voice in the
Maryland Assembly. Her application, however, was unsuccessful.
55
While Margaret Brent, unlike Carfania, was not used as a "bad"
example to establish a provision restricting women, neither did Brent
become an example to encourage more general women's activity in courts.
Two factors likely explain this disapproval of women litigating on behalf
of others. One factor is an increasing professionalization of the litigation
business;' 56 the other is a strengthened bias against women that often
surfaces when a revolutionary movement consolidates into stable power-
holding.1
7
The professionalization of the legal discipline distinguishes and
invigorates the law as a specific part of the normative discourse. 5' This
professionalization monopolizes competition and regulates recruitment,
159
thereby enhancing control over legal constructs and legal functions. Such
a change disables the versatile layperson. In Rome, shortly before
154. CHROUST, supra note 151, at 49; MoPELLo, supra note 4, at 6.
155. Moaauio, supra note 4, at 6-7.
156. As Friedman notes,
The lower levels of the bar were hard to control. Lawyers, like actors and
painters, were often part-timers and amateurs. In 17th-century Maryland,
most lawyers were planters, who spent part of their time on the practice.
It was only in the 18th century that it was possible to speak of lawyers in
Maryland as "professional" at all. Of the 207 attorneys in Maryland
between 1660 and 1715, 79 were planters; others were clerks or merchants;
only 48 could be described as professional lawyers.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 93, at 99 (footnote omitted).
157. See, e.g., BoNNIE S. ANDERSON & JUDrrH P. ZINSSER, 2 A HISTORY OF THEIR OWN:
WOMEN IN EUROPE FROM PREHISTORY To THE PRESENT 350-52 (1988).
158. Internal professionalization has also led to an increase of patriarchal control. The rise
of large law firms has meant further specialization that has prevented women from
litigating in court and has relegated them to research and drafting work. See, e.g.,
Mo.ELLo, supra note 4, at 194-217; Deborah K. Holmes, Structural Causes of
Dissatiyfaction Among Large-Firm Attorneys: A Feminist Perspective, 12 WOMEN's RTS.
L REp. 9, 27 (1990).
159. In the nineteenth century, attending law schools became increasingly necessary to
establishing a legal career. Therefore, women interested in the legal profession focused
on gaining access to such institutions. The Ivy League law schools in the East,
reflecting the highest degree of professionalization, were the last to admit women.
Yale, Columbia, and Harvard did not do so until well into the twentieth century,
whereas the developing states of the Midwest and the West accepted women in their
law schools relatively soon after the Civil War. See MoREU.o, supra note 4, at 39-107.
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Carfania's case, the jurists ceased acting as attorneys in court and left this
responsibility to the rhetoricians.160 This was a new distribution of
functions in the field of litigation and a step toward further
professionalization,'61 a new order that was hardly advantageous for
women lay-advocates.
This specialization was presumably caused by shifts in Roman
society; the old nobility lost some of its dominance, while an expanding
upper class searched for new fields in which to acquire official merits.
162
In America, the professionalization of litigation that occurred in the
eighteenth' 63 and nineteenth centuries'" was mainly caused by the
urbanization and industrialization of society. 6' American women's
struggles for admission to the bar were certainly inhibited by this
professionalization.
The second factor contributing to the disapproval of women acting
in court on behalf of others stems from the fact that political consolida-
tion often leads to reactionary politics; such restorative measures tend to
be directed against women, since women are vulnerable targets for the
demonstration of reinforced patriarchal dominance. Only those revolu-
tionaries who focus on the reconstruction or establishment of order
160. See, e.g., SCHULZ, ROMAN LEcL ScmNce, supra note 3, at 55, 108-109, 119.
161. See BRucE W. Fxum, THE RsE oF Tim RomAN JuRisTs 272, 281-83 (1985).
162. See, e.g., FRA.uz WEAcKER, RdMIsCHE RECHTSGEScHiciTrr 595-617 (1988). The
historic setting of this development is Rome's rise (after the Punic Wars) to a capital
ofunprecedented size, wealth, and cosmopolitan orientation. See alo FviaE, supra note
161, at 282. This resembles the rise of big cities in the nineteenth century, but the
historical approach must not overlook essential differences. Rome's commercial and
urban achievements cannot be properly perceived in terms of the modern industrial
revolution and its type of urbanization.
163. See, e.g., Richard B. Morris, The Legal Profession in America on the Eve of the Revolu-
tion, in PoLITICA. SEPARATION AND LEGAL CoNTINurm 3-34 (Harry W. Jones ed.,
American Bar Association 1976) (papers presented at the annual meeting of the
American Bar Association in Atlanta, Georgia, on August 5-12, 1976).
164. This professionalization did not occur in a progressively linear fashion. Roscoe Pound
describes the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as the formative era for
the legal profession in America. He also speaks about the middle of the nineteenth
century as a period of decadence for the American legal profession, which suffered
from problems of organization, education, and professional training. RoscoE POUND,
THE LAwER FROM ANTIQurry To MODEaN TMSAs 175-249 (1953).
165. The Midwest and West, less consolidated than the Northeast, offered a more permis-
sive situation to women lawyers. In 1869, the Chicago LegalNews reported that Mary
E. Magoon successfully practiced as an attorney in North English, Iowa County.
MoRLLo, supra note 4, at 11. Magoon took advantage of the fact that she could prac-
tice law on the county level without being admitted to the state bar. MolEaLo, supra
note 4, at 11.
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eventually succeed in power. Staying in power requires attaining a firm
grip on the state's institutions."' Under a firm patriarchal grip, some of
women's freedom-in particular, recently gained liberty-is likely to
disappear. 167 The edict resulting from Carfania's example fits into a line
of misogynous legal provisions that figured among the Roman Revolu-
tion's restorative measures. 16 In America as well, the consolidation
following the Revolution resulted in banning women from the litigation
business and subsequently forcing them into a fight for their admission
to the bar.
B. Men's Interference on Women's Way to the Bar
In 1869, Belle Babb Mansfield, then twenty-three years old, was
admitted to the Iowa state bar, thus becoming the first professionally
appointed woman lawyer in the United States.169 The legal reasoning that
opened this avenue to Mansfield is as exceptional as it is noteworthy. The
Iowa Code of 1851 required an applicant to the bar to be a white
male. 7 ' Justice Francis Springer, who delivered the opinion of the Iowa
Supreme Court concerning Mansfield's admission, found by some clever
reasoning that the relevant provision did not exclude women. He
interpreted the term "male" by referring to another Iowa provision, which
said that women were to be included wherever masculine legal terms were
used.
17
166. See supra part I.B., rule 3.
167. The recent radical political change in the former Eastern-bloc countries reveals
examples of women losing liberties as a result of new state concepts and societal
orders. See, e.g., WIDER DAS scHaUcHTEVERGSMEN (Christine Kulke et al. eds., 1992).
168. Two of those provisions appear to be the most significant. One is the marriage
legislation of Augustus, which diminished women's capacity to take under wills unless
they had given birth to legitimate children. Lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, 18 B.C.,
UE 13.1; Lex Papia Poppaea, 9 A.D., UE 16.1-2. The other is the Senatusconsultum
Velleianum (circa 50 A.D. DIG. 16.1 ad senatus consultum Velleianum), which
prohibited women from incurring contractual liabilities for the benefit of third parties.
In particular, it prevented women from becoming guarantors for the debts of others.
As a consequence, the Senatusconsultum Velleianum kept women at the fringe of the
financial market. See J. A. Crook, Feminine Inadequacy and the Senatusconsultum
Vehleianum, in THE FAMILY IN ANcmN'r ROME 83 (Beryl Rawson ed., 1986).
169. Hopp, supra note 4, at 162; MoRELLo, supra note 4, at 11-13.
170. MoaELLo, supra note 4, at 12.
171. MoRELo, supra note 4, at 12. The event must not be misunderstood as part of a
general move toward feminist politics but rather as a rare example of sophisticated
legal technique applied not against women, but for their benefit. See, e.g., HoFF, supra
note 4, at 162-63.
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While Belle Babb Mansfield was admitted to the Iowa bar, Myra
Bradwell 72 was denied admission in Illinois.1  Bradwell brought the
matter to the United States Supreme Court and lost. The decision in
Bradwell v. Illinois,17 which upheld the Illinois statute excluding women
from the bar in the face of constitutional challenge,175 is replete with
evocations of gender mythology. Justice Bradley gives us an excellent
example of the nineteenth-century upper-class patriarchal gender view:
It certainly cannot be affirmed, as a historical fact, that this has ever
been established as one of the fundamental privileges and immuni-
ties of the sex. On the contrary, the civil law, as well as nature
herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective
spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
172. For a derailed history of the life of Myra Bradwell, see JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA'S
FiRsT WoMAN LAwvmu THE BIOGRA"HY op Myam BRADWnEL (1993).
173. The Illinois Supreme Court states:
If we were to admit them, we should be exercising the authority
conferred upon us in a manner which, we are fully satisfied, was never
contemplated by the legislature. Upon this question, it seems to us neither
this applicant herself, nor any unprejudiced and intelligent person, can
entertain the slightest doubt.
It is to be remembered that at the time this statute was enacted, we
had, by express provision, adopted the common law of England, and, with
three exceptions, the statutes of that country passed prior to the fourth year
of James the First, so far as they were applicable to our condition.
It is to be also remembered that female attorneys at law were unknown
in England, and a proposition that a woman should enter the courts of
Westminster Hall in that capacity, or as a barrister, would have created
hardly less astonishment than one that she should ascend the bench of
Bishops, or be elected to a seat in the House of Commons.
It is to be further remembered that when our act was passed, that
school of reform, which daims for women participation in the making and
administering of the laws had not then arisen, or, if here and there a writer
had advanced such theories, they were regarded rather as abstract specula-
tions than as an actual basis for action. That God designed the sexes to
occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make,
apply and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth.
In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 538-39 (1869), affdsub nom. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130 (1872). See also MoIaE.o, supra note 4, at 17-18.
174. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
175. Bradwell 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 138-39. The decision rejects the argument that a
woman would be entitled to admission to the bar as a privilege or immunity under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
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and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life.
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in
the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood.
The harmony, not to say, identity of interests and views which
belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to
the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career
from that of her husband....
... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law
of the Creator....
... [I]n my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics,
destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the province of the
legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be
filled and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those
energies and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which
are presumed to predominate in the sterner sex.176
Justice Bradley's use of gender clichds is extensive and varied. It
lacks only the apocalyptic vision of liberated women torturing honest
men by indulging in fraudulent trickery and hysteria. Apart from that,
his opinion recounts the story of the polarization of men and women
into two spheres.'7 Women are timid, delicate, unfit for many occupa-
tions of civil life, 17' and destined for duty-bound roles as wives and
176. BradweM 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141, 142 (Bradley, J., concurring). The paragraph
divisions have been added by the author.
177. See supra part I.B., rules 4 and 5.
178. Similarly, this attitude is paradigmatically asserted by Judge Horatio Davis in his
commencement address to the graduating class of the East Florida Seminary for
Women:
Within the last month, for the first time in the history of Florida, young
ladies have been examined and licensed to practice law. Whether they will
make a success of it is yet to be determined ....
History is full of the noble deeds of your sex ...
But publicity is not your true sphere. It is a sun that while it warms,
scorches and blisters.
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mothers? 79 Men, the "sterner sex," are expected to protect women and
are privileged to hold the offices and functions of public life and reap
the benefits of such positions.
180
Justice Bradley makes a considerable effort to emphasize that
women's legitimate place is subordinate to men and remote from the
public domain.' He cites a diverse array of sources for support: state
law,182 constitutional law,18 3 jurisprudence,8 4 and "the law of the Cre-
ator." 185 Furthermore, he resorts to the most existential foundations and
the most superior authority imaginable.'86 Justice Bradley first evokes
the metaphysical order of the world, called nature; 7 then he adds
reason' 88 Finding nature and reason insufficient justifications, he asserts
"Seek to be good, but aim not to be great,
A woman's noblest station is retreat...."
Commencement address by Horatio Davis to the graduating dass of the East
Florida Seminary for Women (May 24, 1898), in Moxnu.o, supra note 4, at 42.
179. The arguments in Carfania's case refer to the ethos of female modesty (puiditia)
and reject the idea that women should become involved in male offices (virilia
offlda). There is, however, no explicit reference to the female role of being a wife
and mother. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. The protectionist
argument is also missing in Carfania's case. However, in the provisions based on the
Senatusconsultum Velleianum (DiG. 16.1 ad senatus consultum Velleianum; see also
supra note 168), which prohibits women from making themselves collaterally liable
for the debts of others, Roman jurists espouse a strong protectionist ideology. See,
e.g., Crook, supra note 168, at 85.
180. For a discussion of virilia offlcia, see supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
181. See supra part I.B., rule 1.
182. Bradwel 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 142 (Bradley, J., concurring).
183. Bradwel 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 140-41 (Bradley, J., concurring).
184. Bradwel 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
185. Bradwel 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
186. In contrast, a sexist ideology with a more practical focus was expressed by Yale
graduate George G. Sill in an 1872 letter to Yale Law School, making the first request
for the admission of a woman. Apparently, it failed to produce a formal answer:
A young lady has applied to me for permission to become a student of law
in my office. I advised her to seek admission into Yale Law School for one
year and then enter my office. Are you far advanced enough to admit young
women to your school? In theory I am in favour of their studying &
practising law, provided they are ugly, but I should fear a handsome woman
before a jury.
Letter from George G. Sill to Yale Law School (Mar. 9, 1872), in MoREao, supra
note 4, at 90-91.
187. See supra part I.B., rules 7 and 8.
188. See supra part I.B., rule 4.
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finally that women's roles are directly decreed by God.189
Justice Bradley's effort produces an overblown argument. His
rejection of Myra Bradwell's application becomes obsessive, thereby
diminishing his credibility. It appears as if he needed not only to con-
vince his audience but also to convince himself of the decision's correct-
ness.1 90 Justice Bradley's sermon proved in some respects more wishful
than compelling. In 1879, the sexist sentiment expressed in his opinion
was substantially frustrated by a statute1 91 that provided for women's
admission to the bar of the United States Supreme Court.1 92
C. The Tedious Fight for Women asJurots
The patriarchal desire to exclude women from active participation
in the courts has also dominated the discussion of women's jury ser-
vice.193 The categorical exclusion of women jurors, developed as a rule of
English common law,194 died a slow death. The final steps toward
189. BradweM 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Justice Bradley speaks
of divine ordinance and of the Creator.
190. His opinion shows that Justice Bradley is aware that benefits are at stake and thus
explicitly addresses the problem of distribution. He argues that men, who bear the
responsibility of conducting public affairs, are entitled to the benefits of such
activities. See Bradwelg 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 142 (Bradley, J., concurring).
191. An Act to Relieve Certain Legal Disabilities of Women, 20 Star. 292 (1879).
192. The enactment was initiated by and particularly fought for by Belva A. Lockwood.
HoFF, supra note 4, at 183-84; MoaRELo, supra note 4, at 34-35.
193. See HoFF, supra note 4, at 224-27.
194. Blackstone explains that women were barred from jury service "because of the defect
of sex": "propter deftctum sexus." 3 Wlui.mia BIAcmSoNE, ComimNmaTs *362. The
same idea (deftctus sexus) seems to have kept the Roman woman from being a udex,
who was the Roman official with functions similar to the juror. The iudex, appointed
for a specific case, acted according to the litigation program that was decreed for him
by the praetor. For an explanation of practor and iudex see supra note 26. Through
this program, the iudex received detailed guidance about how to hear evidence and
decide the case.
Even though the iudx was not a magistrate, his function was of such importance
in public life that men seem to have strictly reserved it for themselves. The sources
reveal little reasoning for this gender rule. The Roman jurist Ulpianus simply
connects the iudex' function with the male sex: "Feminae ab omnibus officiis civiibus
vel publicis remotae sunt et iko nec iudices esse possunt nec magistratum gerere nec
postulare nec pro allo intervenire necprocuratores oistere." DIG. 50.17.2 (Ulpianus 1
ad Sabinuni). (Translation: Women are excluded from all civil or public functions;
therefore, they can neither be iudices nor hold the office of a magistrate nor make
applications or interventions for another person, nor be procurators.) Paulus attributes
the exclusion of women from functioning as iudices to custom: "Quidam enim lege
impediuntur ne iudices sint, quidam natura, quidam moribus.... Moribusfeminae et
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substantial gender equality in jury service were taken only in recent
decades.195 There were even dissenting opinions expressing a pointed
resistance to gender equality in the 1994 Supreme Court decision that
held gender-based peremptory strikes unconstitutional.'96
The heart of Justice Bradley's philosophy in Bradwell v. Illinois,'97
which relegates women to the domestic sphere and men to the public
sphere, is also apparent in the result and the reasoning of Hoyt v.
Florida." This 1961 Supreme Court decision assumed and confirmed
a traditional gender view; the Court maintained this view until its 1975
decision in Taylor v. Louisiana.'99 Hoyt held that Florida's practice of
automatically excluding women from jury service unless they explicitly
asked to serve was constitutional.00 Justice Harlan delivered the opinion
of the Court:
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restric-
tions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many
servi, non quia non habent iudicium, sed quia receptum est, ut civilibus officis non
fungantur." DIG. 5.1.12.2 (Paulus 17 ad edictum). (Translation: In fact, some are
prevented by statute from being iudices, some by nature, some by custom. ....
Women and slaves by custom, not because they lack judgment, but because it is
accepted that they do not perform civil functions.)
195. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1974).
A system excluding all women, however, is a wholly different matter. It is
untenable to suggest these days that it would be a special hardship for each
and every woman to perform jury service or that society cannot spare any
women from their present duties. This may be the case with many, and it
may be burdensome to sort out those who should be exempted from those
who should serve. But that task is performed in the case of men, and the
administrative convenience in dealing with women as a class is insufficient
justification for diluting the quality of community judgment represented
by the jury in criminal trials.
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534-35 (footnote omitted).
196. J.E.B v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1434-36 (1994) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
dissenting); id. at 1436-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see infia notes 211-225 and
accompanying text.
For a discussion of gender-based peremptory strikes, see, e.g., Deborah L.
Forman, What Diffrence Does It Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S
LJ. 35 (1992); David Everett Marko, The Case Against Gender-Based Peremptory
Challenges, 4 HA=tNGS WOMEN'S UJ. 109 (1993).
197. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
198. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
199. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that the practice of systematically excluding women
from state jury duty is unconstitutional). See, e.g., Hall v. Mississippi, 385 U.S. 98
(1966) (affirming the reasoning of Hoyt v. Florida).
200. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61-62.
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parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to men,
woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life. We
cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a State,
acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a woman
should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she
herself determines that such service is consistent with her own
special responsibilities.
201
The tone of Justice Harlan's statement may be different from Justice
Bradley's in Bradwell v. Illinois,20 2 but its substance is remarkably similar.
Women are essentially homemakers, wives, and mothers,0 3 while men
are obviously envisioned differently. This difference sets a standard for'
men as less committed to the practical challenges and the emotional
dynamics of family life than women.
According to Justice Harlan, the two-sphere gender concept promotes
general welfare." This argument is as traditional as it is specious.20 5
Harlan evokes the idea of general welfare but fails to explain it. Rather,
he seems to identify the existing order with the general welfare. This
approach contains a one-dimensional concept of legitimacy-any devia-
tion from the given order automatically means an illegitimate attack
against the general welfare. Thus, Harlan resorts to a circular argument.
His approach fails to utilize a notion of general welfare that can serve as
an independent criterion for the legitimacy of the respective order.206 This
simplification might, however, be expedient. In a conservative view, the
fear of exposing those who benefit from the given societal order provides
good reason to avoid a serious discussion of this welfare concept.
207
Justice Bradley explains in Bradwell v. Illinois that "[m]an is, or
should be, woman's protector and defender."20 ' Like Justice Bradley,
201. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61-62.
202. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); see supra text accompanying notes 175-181.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89 and notes 177-192.
204. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61-62. See supra part I.B., rule 1.
205. For an earlier example of the use of this argument, see Letter from John Adams to
James Sullivan, supra note 83.
206. Another way of superficially discussing the general welfare is to draft a biased,
pessimistic scenario depicting the end of civilized society should the existing order
change. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
207. See supra part I.B., rules 1 and 3.
208. Bradwel4 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
"[Elven the disabilities which the wife lies under, are for the most part intended
for her protection and benefit: so great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of
England." 1 WImLi. BLAcKSToNE, CohmmiTAsuS *445.
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Justice Harlan regards generally relieving women from their civic duty as
legitimate. Not incidentally, his argument focuses on the burdens of jury
service and ignores its benefits. The patriarchal strategy is to hide the
fact that jurors are exercising a civic right and that their role, since it is
vested with legal authority, allows them to participate significantly in the
societal discourse.
09
Although many of the nineteenth-century gender stereotypes seem
to have disappeared from current judicial opinions, judges still use the
conservative approach of preserving gender rules by minimizing gender
issues.210 In the recent Supreme Court decision ofJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. TB.," which held that gender-based peremptory strikes of potential
jurors are unconstitutional,212 the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia provide evidence of this method. Chief
Justice Rehnquist rejects the majority's reliance on Batson v. Kentucky,213
which prohibits race-based peremptory strikes:
Racial groups comprise numerical minorities in our society, war-
ranting in some situations a greater need for protection, whereas
the population is divided almost equally between men and
women. Furthermore, while substantial discrimination against both
groups still lingers in our society, racial equality has proved a more
challenging goal to achieve on many fronts than gender
equality.
2 1 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent expresses two peculiar ideas. The first
is that only numerical minorities warrant specific protection. Chief
Justice Rehnquist apparently assumes that because women are not a
numerical minority, they are sufficiently served by having access to the
institutions and proceedings of democracy.2 15 The second idea is that
gender equality may be neglected because "racial equality has proved to
be a more challenging goal to achieve. .. This is a manipulative
polarization of two distinct, but nevertheless substantially related,21
209. See supra part I.B., rules 8 and 9.
210. See supra part I.B., rules 4 and 9.
211. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
212. Id. at 1421.
213. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
214. J.EB., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
215. See supra part I.B., rule 3.
216. J.EB., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
217. See, e.g., JuDriT BuTman, BODIEs Tka' MAxra' 18, 167 (1993); CATHArI NE A.
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political and legal commitments-race equality and gender equality 21
Moreover, the attribution of the phrase "more challenging" to race-
matters oddly depreciates gender-matters as issues of relatively little
importance.
219
Justice Scalia similarly adopts a minimizing approach in his
dissent. 220 This first becomes obvious in his semantics: he insists on
speaking of sex instead of gender, thus reducing the impact of the
decision on the legal gender discourse. 221 Furthermore, he depicts the
historical considerations in the majority opinion as irrelevant and adds
derisive comments:
[TIhe Court treats itself to an extended discussion of the historic
exclusion of women not only from jury service, but also from
service at the bar (which is rather like jury service, in that it
involves going to the courthouse a lot).
222
By making this casual joke, Scalia attempts to conceal that attorneys
and juries share a material common denominator, in that both play a
significant role in the power game.223 When women practice law and
render jury service, they are doing much more than "going to the
iMAcKwNoN, A Raly Against Rape, in FmIlNISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 5, 81-82;
MAcKNNoN, Art supra note 8, at 2; Emma Coleman Jordan, Race, Gender, and
Social Class in the Thomas Sexual Harassment Hearings: The Hidden Fault Lines in
Political Discourse, 15 HIv. WOMEN'S .J. 1 (1992); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism and
Feminist Legal Theory, 12 Hnv. WOMEN's I.J. 115 (1989); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U.J. GENDER & L 1
(1993); Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14
HARv. WOMEN's UJ. 21 (1991).
218. See, e.g., MoaRuLo, supra note 4, at 143-72.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 234, 238-242. A similar manipulative approach
resulting from a distortedly narrow view of the issues at stake is taken by the Court
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206, 208 (1986). For Justice Blackmun's
criticism of that approach, see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206, 208 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). See infra note 302.
220. See supra note 15.
221. For Justice Scalia's semantics, see supra note 15.
222. J.E.B, 114 S. Ct. at 1436 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia further com-
ments that "the Court's legal reasoning in this case is largely obscured by anti-male-
chauvinist oratory .... J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223. "The lawyer role has as its implicit norms the same qualities that are the explicit
norms of masculinity as it is socially defined. It is a power role." MAcKmNoN, On
Exceptionality: Women as Women in Law, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 5,
at 74 [hereinafter MAcKINNON, Exeeptionality].
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courthouse a lot."224 They are playing an active part in the institutional
proceeding, thereby exercising a function of essentially public signifi-
cance.2 2
5
D. A Carfanian Adventure in New York, I98x-z983
Carfania's story is ancient but is not antiquarian history. Men still
condemn women 'to' self-restraining "decency,"226 and this attitude
sometimes invades the legal discourse. In a recent well-known case, a
female New York attorney was rudely silenced by a judge.227 Martha
Copleman, the attorney, reports:
The judge went into a long diatribe about how legal services
lawyers bring a lot of frivolous cases, clog the court's calendar and
should be confined to a special court for legal services-initiated
proceedings. At one point during his questioning he addressed me
as "little girl". I objected, and requested that he address me as
"counselor". He apologized. Finally, he denied my request for
interim relief, and rescheduled the case to be heard several weeks
later. I then requested a shorter adjournment, and he exploded. In
the middle of my reargument, he ordered me to be quiet and, by
way of denying my final request for a briefer adjournment of the
case, yelled: "I tell you what, little girl, you lose!"
228
It appears that, like Carfania,229 Copleman had exercised her
litigation rights without diffidence or womanish coquetry, thereby
224. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. Justice Scalia's disdain for historical arguments is inconsistent with his use of such
arguments when it serves his ends. For example, he writes:
In order, it seems to me, not to eliminate any real denial of equal protec-
tion, but simply to pay conspicuous obeisance to the equality of the sexes,
the Court imperils a practice that has been considered an essential part of
fair jury trial since the dawn of the common law. The Constitution of the
United States neither requires nor permits this vandalizing of our people's
traditions.
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. In Carfania's case, it is the notion ofpudicitia. See supra notes 56-60 and accompa-
nying text.
227. See supra part I.B., rule 13.
228. Martha Copleman, Sexism in the Courtroom: Report from a "Little Girl Lawyer", 9
WoMEN's RTS. L REP. 107, 107-08 (1986).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
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provoking the judge, Anthony T. Jordan, Jr., to react in a blatantly
discriminatory manner." The judge finds Copleman's presence in the
courtroom offensive. He degrades her professional commitment by
blaming her for bringing frivolous cases, humiliates her by repeatedly
addressing her as "little girl," and silences her with his order to be
quiet. 2
1
Copleman subsequently filed a complaint against the judge, and the
case was tried before the New York State Commission of Judicial
Conduct. 2 2 The majority of the Commission held that the judge's
behavior constituted misconduct and that he should be admonished. 2
3
However, one member of the Commission, John J. Bower, delivered a
dissenting opinion in which he stated that there was no misconduct and
therefore no grounds for sanction:
To prosecute a judge for anything trivial was aptly described by
Horace some 2,000 years ago: "The mountains will be in labor,
and a ridiculous mouse will be brought forth." . . .
I am not persuaded that we must make a public example of
respondent so that no judge in the state will insult sensitive female
lawyers by calling even one, in an inadvertent manner, "little
girl".
234
Bower's quotation of Horace returns us to Carfania. Horace, born
in 65 B.C.,z" probably knew of her as a contemporary. In his dissenting
opinion, Bower utilizes the proven patriarchal method of attempting to
dispose of an issue by labelling it trivial.236
230. Copleman, suspecting that the judge also harbored a dass prejudice against legal
services' dients, condudes: "The judge's mounting irritation at my assertive insis-
tence on my dient's right to access to the court was, I think, what finally elicited the
'little girl' remark." Copleman, supra note 228, at 108.
231. Similarly, the restriction of Roman women's litigation rights resulting from
Carfania's case is based on the argument that she lacked pudicitia and disturbed the
magistrate's peace ("magistratum inquietans"). See supra text accompanying notes
65-67.
232. In re Anthony T. Jordan, Jr., 3 N.Y. Comm'n Jud. Conduct 193 (1983).
233. In re Anthony TJordan, Jr., 3 N.Y. Comm'n Jud. Conduct at 195.
234. In re Anthony Tordan, Jr., 3 N.Y. Comm'n Jud. Conduct at 197 (Bower, Comm'r,
dissenting) (quoting Hoa. Ans. 139, "parturient montes, nascetur idiculus mus.").
235. Quintus Horatius Flaccus, Dec. 8, 65 B.C.-Nov. 27, 8 B.C. See THE OXFORD
CLAsscA. DicriotNY 527 (2d ed. 1970).
236. See supra part I.B., rule 9.
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Furthermore, his citation of Horace's metaphor has an insidious
double message. Bower ridicules Copleman by contrasting the moun-
tains, the machinery of male justice, to a mouse, the female attorney.
His insult goes beyond that of the trial judge; he insinuates that the
complaining lawyer is not only a "little girl," but also a little animal. By
referring to her in this way, he both incapacitates and dehumanizes
her.3
7
Bower's distortion continues when he contemptuously speaks of
Copleman as "sensitive,"" 8 thus attributing to female lawyers an attitu-
dinal weakness that renders them unfit for professional business in the
courtroom.239 Bower seems determined to prevent Judge Jordan from
becoming an- example that reflects the iules of appropriate judicial
behavior.240 Therefore, Bower refuses to join a decision that should have
some impact on the fight to eliminate bias against women in the
courts,241 stating, "I am not persuaded that we must make a public
example...."
242
V. PATRIARCHAL OUTLAWING OF NON-MASCULINITY
Patriarchy frequently operates by exercising the power of definition.
To define is to set limits and to determine what is inside and what is
beyond those limits. Two achievements of patriarchy's power to define
are of primary significance for the present analysis. The first is the myth
of women's inability to hold official power (preferably by creating
deterrent examples of powerful women). The second is the degradation
of men who reveal behavior that patriarchy regards as feminine.
237. See supra part I.B., rule 12.
238. In reAnthony Tordan, Jr., 3 N.Y. Comm'n Jud. Conduct at 197 (Bower, Comm'r,
dissenting).
239. See supra part I.B., rules 10 and 11.
240. For the pattern of exemplum, see supra part I.C.
241. As Copleman describes it, the case seems to have developed into an example:
"Apparently, according to reports I have received, this decision had a tremendous
impact on older male judges, which proves to me that it was the very subtlety of the
insult 'little girl' and its condemnation which made the Commission's determination
so educational." Copleman, supra note 228, at 108.
242. In re Anthony T Jordan, Jr., 3 N.Y. Comm'n. Jud. Conduct at 197 (Bower,
Comn'r, dissenting).
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A. Male Blindness to Images of Women in Official Power
Patriarchy has deeply internalized the separation of feminine gender
and official power.u4 3 The few images of women who exert considerable
power beyond the domestic sphere bear largely fictitious features. 244 The
fictitious negative exaggeration of these images works in two ways: it
both prevents women's positive identification and provokes a common
reaction of contempt and repellence.
245
Antique Greek myth provides two archetypes of such images in
Western tradition. Among those women who involve themselves in the
power game, two figures emerge-Medea and the Amazon. 2  They are
constructs of genuinely powerful women; that is, they enjoy positions
distinct from the male origin and control of power..
Medea performs a highly political and public act when she radically
rejects her role of wife and mother.247 She opposes the divorce pursued
by her husband Jason, and she also kills the two sons she has had with
Jason as well as his wife-to-be, Glauke.z " Medea's power is not derived
243. "A woman can also take the male point of view or exercise male power, although she
remains always a woman. Our access to male power is not automatic as men's is;
we're not born and raised to it." MAcKnmNoN, Desire, supra note 66, at 52; see also
Berger & Robinson, supra note 6, at 73-80.
244. Margaret Brent, see supra text accompanying notes 151-155, was not an image, but
a real woman who was exceptionally successful in legal business. Evidence of the
male reaction to the presence of this woman in the official domain can be gleaned
from the terms of their discourse-they frequently addressed her as: "Gentleman
Margaret Brent." See MoRELLo, supra note 4, at 3.
245. See supra part I.B., rules 1 and 5.
246. Greek mythology provides other examples of powerful women (such as Klytemnestra,
Elektra, Kassandra, Lysistrate, and Antigone), but their power seems largely limited
and controlled. When they deviate from the patterns of patriarchy they are ignored,
misunderstood, discouraged, or (more severely) punished by the patriarchal regime.
See, e.g., MARY R LEFgowrIz, WomEN iN GasaK MyTr 80-94 (1986).
247. See, e.g., CmmRnzLA, supra note 7, at 67-69 (with references to the play Medea by
Euripides).Acomparable conflict between matriarchal claims and patriarchal principles
can be discovered in Aeschylus' Eumenides (The Furies). See KATE Miu ar, S-oxAu
PoLmcs 157-60 (1969).
248. Medea can be sharply contrasted with a woman who is depicted in a Roman funerary
inscription. 3 FoNTs Inus RomtAqi A-mjusnmmuui, supra note 64, at 209-18. For
a translation of the funerary inscription, called the "/audatio Turiae," see LnsKoWrrz
& FmTr, supra note 7, at 135-39. This woman is probably the person Valerius
Maximus refers to as Turia. VtA.. MAx. 6.7.2. Turia died in or shortly before 9 B.C.
See DmrTra FLACH, Dm soGENANNTE LAUDATIO TuRLAE 5-6 (1991). Praising Turia,
the inscription enumerates what the Roman patriarchs regarded as women's virtues,
called domestica bona (domestic goods). The first of the virtues ascribed to Turia is
pudidtia. 3 FoNTrEs IuRis RoMAm ANrnjusrnuAs, supra note 64, at 212. For an
explanation of pudictia, see supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. Turia is
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from an official function, but rather lies in her crimes. Her power has a
twofold negative connotation. In the eyes of the Greek patriarchy,
Medea's power is not only destructive and criminal, but also relies on
witchcraft. After she has committed her crimes, she even succeeds in
leaving the country, and thus she evades punishment by the Greeks.
The Greeks, who invented Medea, deliberately made her a
barbarian (she is not Greek but from Kolchis, located at the Black Sea)
and invested her with magical forces. Because the Greeks perceived the
elements of feminine gender and genuine, not male-derived, power as
incompatible, they attribute Medea's power to a dark and mysterious
source.
The Amazons are another example of a mythical image of women
who exert genuine power.2 9 They are portrayed as even more inhuman
than Medea. The Greeks viewed the Amazons as combat machines.2 50
For example, the Amazons cut off one breast in order to be unham-
pered in archery. The myth also claims that they use men only as slave
labor and occasionally resort to foreigners for the purpose of concep-
tion.251
Male resistance to images of women in positions of official power
still exists in the courtroom. 2 2 The common reaction to the appearance
particularly admired for having offered a divorce to her husband out of altruism.
Because their marriage was childless, Turia wanted to give her husband the
opportunity to remarry and have legitimate natural offspring. 3 FoNras Iuus RommI
ATmjusnm4i, supra note 64, at 216. See generally CmaaT , supra note 7, at
132-33; FLAcH, supra.
249. For their appearance in antique literature, see, e.g., Homer, haas 2.814, 3.189,6.186;
Herodot, HisTORIAE 4.110-4.117; and Diodor, BIBUOTHEKE 2.45.3, 3.53.3. See also
PLurr. THus. 26; Iusnm. 2.4.9. For modern discussions see, e.g., CATmrtLA, supra
note 7, at 3, 16-17; Lpxowrrz, supra note 246, at 17-20, 22-23, 26-27, 36.
250. For women's roles and functions vis-k-vis the military of Roman antiquity, see, e.g.,
Margaretha Debrunner Hall, Eine reine Mannerwd?, in REINE MXNNERSACHE?
FRAUEN IN MXNNERDOMXNaN DER ANTIKEN WELT 207, 207-28 (Maria H.
Dettenhofer ed., 1994). For antique sources on women gladiators, see LEPKOWITZ &
FmIT, supra note 7, at 213-15. For a discussion of the enduring resistance to
women participating in combat, see, e.g., Elizabeth Vidliers Gemmette, Armed
Combat:. The Women's Movement Mobilizes Troops in Readiness fir the Inevitable
Constitutional Attack on the Combat Exclusion for Women in the Military, 12 WoM-
EN's RTs. L REP. 89 (1990). For a discussion on women's roles in the armed
forces, see, e.g., WOMEN N rTHE MiuTARY (E. A. Blacksmith ed., 1992).
251. See DIoD. 2.45.3, 3.53.3; PLur. ThEs. 26; IusTnN. 2.4.9.
252. For example, Justice Lawrence, delivering the court's opinion in In re Bradwell, 55
Ill. 535 (1869), affd sub nom. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872)
(see supra text accompanying notes 172-176), comments on male lawyers' patriar-
chal conservatism and expresses a paternalistic commitment to women's liberation:
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of a woman attorney illustrates a perfidious dilemma.2 53 The initial
reproach, put forward by the client and nurtured by male colleagues in
her firm,254 is that she is not aggressive enough.255 However, as soon as
a woman displays the assertiveness that men usually show in court,5 6
the accusation becomes, "she is too pushy."257 This criticism implies
that the lawyer is foremost seen as a woman251 who should not confront
While those theories which are popularly known as "woman's rights" can
not be expected to meet with a very cordial acceptance among the mem-
bers of a profession, which, more than any other, inclines its followers, if
not to stand immovable upon the ancient ways, at least to make no hot
haste in measures of reform, still, all right minded men must gladly see
new spheres of action opened to woman, and greater inducements offered
her to seek the highest and widest culture.
In re BradweM 55 I11. at 542. See also, e.g., Berger & Robinson, supra note 6, at
88-102. Furthermore, Karen Berger Morello remembers:
Throughout much of the 1970s I found myself conspicuously the only
woman lawyer in the courtroom. On several occasions I was told to sit
down and wait for my lawyer to show up. Once, when I approached the
bench for a pretrial conference, the presiding judge refused to believe I
was a lawyer. A crowded and noisy courtroom fell silent as he demanded
to know the date and place of my admission to the bar. When I gave the
information the judge winked at me and said, "Okay, I'm sorry, honey,"
then he and the spectators exploded with laughter.
MoRLLo, supra note 4, at xi. See also supra part IV.D.
253. This dilemma is produced by patriarchy's stereotyping categorizations: "[To be a
woman means either to be like a man or to be like a lady. We have to meet either
the male standard for males or the male standard for females." MAcKiNNON,
Exceptionality, supra note 223, at 71.
254. For the oppression that women encounter as lawyers in big law firms, see also supra
note 158.
255. Moaaao, supra note 4, at 188-92, 204, 210, 241. See supra part I.B., rule 11.
256. Maesia Sentinas, the woman Valerius Maximus speaks of before he tells Carffaia's
story, see supra note 67, is depicted as having exhibited such a masculine mind
("sub specie feminae virilem animum gerebat') that she was called "Androgyne," the
"man-woman." VAi. MAX. 8.3.1.
257. MoaaR.o, supra note 4, at 188-89.
258. See, e.g., Justice Lawrence in In re Bradwell:
There are some departments of the legal profession in which she can
appropriately labor. Whether, on the other hand, to engage in the hot
strifes of the bar, in the presence of the public, and with momentous
verdicts the prizes of the struggle, would not tend to destroy the defer-
ence and delicacy with which it is the pride of our ruder sex to treat her,
is a matter certainly worthy of her consideration.
In re Bradwe, 55 lll. at 542. See also supra text accompanying notes 172-176.
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and embarrass men in court by transgressing the norms' of female
delicacy.
Finally, there may be an even stronger bias against women
judges. 59 The patriarchs instinctively guard the judicial domain, where
the power is greater and more expressive than in other legal areas and
where a woman, because of her official position, would be protected by
the dignity of the court against the sexism of attorneys or parties. Thus,
patriarchy seems to focus its control on the judicial recruitment process,
which on the whole disfavours women.260 This strategy is evidenced by
the low percentage of women judges.261' Even when a woman does
succeed to the bench, she is likely to be appointed to a court of inferior
jurisdiction or of family matters.262
B. Patriarcby's Artistry in Creating and Modiing Gender
Another conspicuous patriarchal strategy that works by gender
definition is to oppress men by "feminizing" them. This process of
"feminizing," by which men are subjected to gender rules originally
developed for and connected with women, is likely to result in exclud-
ing some men from official functions, such as conducting legal business.
This takes us back to functions in court and to the Roman legal
provisions surrounding Carfania's case.263 The Romans excluded not
only women from making applications on behalf of others, but also
other groups: blind persons,2" persons condemned for a capital
crime,265 gladiators,26 and men known to have engaged in passive
259. See, e.g., MORELLO, supra note 4, at 218-47; Berger & Robinson, supra note 6, at
89-93; Beverly B. Cook, Women Judges: A Preface to Their History, 14 GOLDEN
GATE U. L REv. WomEN's L FORUM 573 (1984).
260. See supra part I.B., rule 12.
261. For statistics, see, e.g., Berger & Robinson, supra note 6, at 89-93; Resnik, supra
note 1, at 1770-71. For a discussion of the small percentages of women judges in
the federal courts, see, e.g., Resnik, supra note 1, at 1700-12.
262. See, e.g., MoRE.Lo, supra note 4, at 225-27 (noting that few female judges serve on
traditionally male benches); Berger & Robinson, supra note 6, at 89-91 (finding
that women encounter glass ceilings in the legal profession).
263. See supra part II.
264. See DIG. 3.1.1.5 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum).
265. See DIG. 3.1.1.6 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum). Similarly, a man condemned for
calumnia, i.e., vexatious litigation, is excluded from making applications on behalf
of others. See DIG. 3.1.1.5 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum).
266. See DIG. 3.1.1.6 (Ulpianis 6 ad edictum) (applying the restriction to the man who
has hired out his services to fight against beasts in the arena).
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homosexual acts. The last category is noteworthy in terms of gender, as
Ulpianus' report makes clear:
Removet autem a postulando pro aliis et eum, qui corpore suo muli-
ebria passus est... "267
Translation: '
He [the praetor]268 excludes also that one from making applica-
tions for others who has submitted his body in the female man-
ner....
In ancient Rome, the practice of sodomy269 resulted in some
discrimination, but it was a marginal issue at law.27" The Roman legal
sources regard homosexual activity as a crime only in cases of rape or
when a juvenile is involved.27' This contradicts Chief Justice Burger's
claim in Bowers v. Hardwick272 that "[hlomosexual sodomy was a capital
crime under Roman law."273 His argument is designed to suggest that
virtually the whole of Western civilization, even ancient Rome with its
267. DIG. 3.1.1.6 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum). For an explanation of this inscription, see
supra note 37.
268. For a discussion of praetor, see supra note 26.
269. Against the background of mostly historical sources, it seems appropriate to use the
word "sodomy" as a descriptive term denoting homosexual acts. For the intro-
duction of "sodomy" as a legal term, see infia note 276.
270. A person who voluntarily submits to stuprum (illegitimate sexual conduct) will be
fined one-half of his property and prohibited to dispose of the other half by way of
will. The passive male sodomire seems to be included in this provision. PAUL SE=T.
2.26.13; see also Con. 5.2.2.
271. A republican statute, the Lex Scatinia (149 B.C., Cic. fam. 8.14), seems to have
levied a fine for stuprum (illegitimate sexual conduct) cum masculo (with a man).
The statute is never referred to in the transmitted writings of Roman jurists. The
Augustan Lex Iulia de adulteriis (18 B.C., SuET. Oct. 34), which proscribed
stuprum, led to a comment by the jurist Modestinus explaining that stuprum
included acts committed with a widow, a virgin, or a boy. DIG. 48.5.35.1
(Modestinus 1 regulanim). Thus it seems that before the fourth century A.D.,
criminal prosecution of homosexual activity between men focused on cases of rape
(PAUL SENT. 2.26.12; see also CoL. 5.2.1) or cases involving juveniles. See also
DERRICK S. BAILEY, HoMosaxuAmY AND THE WSTERN CHRsTiaN TRtADITON
64-70 (1955); DANILO DALIA, "UBI VmNUs MtrrxruA": OMossssuATX E DIRTO
NEL MONDO ROMANO 7-131 (1987).
272. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the constitutional right to privacy does not
supersede state law criminalizing private, consensual sodomy). For a discussion of
the case, see Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosueuality, and Political Values: Search-
ingfir the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE LJ. 1073 (1988).
273. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
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pagan ethics pre-dating Christian morals, regarded homosexual activity
between consenting adults as a horrid offense.
274
Before the Christianization of the Roman state in the fourth centu-
ry A.D., Roman law2 5 deals very little with sodomy.276 Nevertheless,
Roman ethics do taint sodomy as dishonorable behavior. In ancient
Rome, for example, if a man became known as a sodomite, his career
274. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Burger argues:
Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject
to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization.
Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian [sic]
moral and ethical standards. Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime
under Roman law. See Code Theod. 9.7.6; Code Just. 9.9.31. See also D.
Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition 70-81
(1975). ... To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of
moral teaching.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Burger's citation of Bailey refers to Bailey's chapter on the Christian Roman
emperors; the preceding chapter explains how little pre-Constantinian legislation
and practice were concerned with homosexual conduct. BMaLEY, supra note 271, at
64-70.
275. The body of rules referred to as Roman law is primarily understood as the law of
Roman antiquity prior to the Constantine Christianization in the fourth century
A.D. There is also a second, much broader understanding of Roman law. In terms
of legal tradition, the thread of Roman law (first evident in the Twelve Tables, circa
450 B.C.) has never been cut off. REINHARD ZIMRMANM, THE LAw OF OBLIGA-
TIONS: RoMAN FOuNDATION OF THE Crvn.mN TRADI ON x-xi (1990). In South
Africa, Roman law still constitutes a considerable part of the legal system. ZIMMER-
MANN, supra, at xiii. In the countries of the civil law tradition, Roman legal thought
lives on in the concepts of statutes that have replaced Justinian's Corpus Iuris
Civiis. ZiMmmANN, supra, at x-xi.
276. Of the two sources cited in Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), the first, CODE TH. 9.7.6, is an enactment
by the emperors Valentinianus, Theodosius, and Arcadius, dated August 6, 390
A.D. See also CoL. 5.3. The second, CODE J. 9.9.31, see also CODE TH. 9.7.3, is
an enactment by the emperors Constantius and Constans, dated December 4, 342
A.D. Both enactments provide severe punishment for homosexual activity.
Surprisingly, Chief Justice Burger does not mention the statute Nov. 141
(dated March 15, 559 A.D.), by which the emperor Justinian recriminalized men's
homosexual conduct and, by reference to the Old Testament's story of Sodom,
Genesis 19:5, created sodomy as a criminal legal term. Nov. 141 became the leading
legal source used in the criminalization of sodomy for centuries. "[Tihe juristic fame
of their [Nov. 141 and Nov. 77] promulgator has invested them with a special
authority, with the result that they have exerted a strong influence upon the forma-
tion of mediaeval and modem opinion, and have tended to standardize punish-
ments of extreme severity." BAILEY, supra note 271, at 73.
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in the public domain would be jeopardized.2"7
The Romans' feeling of repugnance for acts of sodomy reflects
patriarchal gender definitions.2 7 Patriarchy shapes our conceptions of
gender279 mainly by establishing interrelational rules of supremacy and
subordination.80 In defining gender, patriarchy attributes the stereotyped
characteristics of masculine gender to male sex and of feminine gender
to female sex. In addition, however, patriarchy creates a peculiar cross-
correlation between its categories of sex and gender: a person of male sex
who engages in a sexual practice that is labelled "feminine" will be
gendered "feminine" and thus subjected to subordination like the female
sex.281 The Roman law concerning litigation rights offers evidence of this
pattern. A man who practices sex in the female manner (by being
penetrated) has his litigation rights abridged just as if he were a woman. 8 2
This patriarchal pattern, while ancient, is still quite prevalent.2 3 It
persists in every jurisdiction, in the United States284 and elsewhere, that
277. This is illustrated, for example, by Roman historians' repeated reference to military
leaders and statesmen who suffered prosecution and discrimination upon being
accused of homosexual activity. For a brief list of antique Roman sources reporting
such incidents, see AMY RiCHLN, THE GARDEN OF PRIAPUS: SEXUALI AND
AGGRESSION nq RomAN HUMOR 87-88 (2d ed. 1992). For a survey and discussion
of Roman sources concerning male homosexuality, see JOHN BoswELu,
CmHusmvN, SocIAL TOLERANcE, AND HoMosExuAnry 61-87 (1980); see also
RPcHuN, supra, at 220-26, 257-59, 287-91.
278. For gender as a social category that might even feminize men, see MAcKmNoN,
Desire, supra note 66, at 56.
279. Patriarchy tends to camouflage that the conceptions of gender are shaped and can be
reshaped in society's discourse. See supra part I.B., rule 7. For example, Justice White,
who delivered the opinion of the court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
states: "No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated ... ." Bowers, 478 U.S. at
191. Procreation is a phenomenon that is not as obviously connected with homosexu-
ality as with heterosexuality. However, family and marriage are societal constructs, and
whether their connection to sexual conduct (which Justice White asserts to be relevant)
can be found depends completely on what society defines as family and marriage.
280. "Gender is an inequality of power, a social status based on who is permitted to do
what to whom." MAcKmNoN, Art, supra note 8, at 8.
281. See supra part I.B., rules 10 and 11.
282. See DIG. 3.1.1.6 (Ulpianus 6 ad edictum) (explaining that a man raped by robbers
or enemies is not subject to the woman-like restriction of litigation rights).
283. For a discussion of equal protection for homosexuals, see Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual
Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority,
14 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 263 (1992).
284. As of 1993, the criminal statutes of twenty-four American states and the District of
Columbia made adult consensual sodomy a crime. LMBuNs, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW
80 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
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criminalizes homosexual activity.8 5 Today, the traditional criminal
concept of sodomy has developed a broader meaning, labelled "deviant
sexual intercourse." Thus, as a rule, the criminalization has extended to
the active sodomite and sometimes even to certain forms of sexual acts
between partners of the different sexes.2 6
Nevertheless, societal condemnation still focuses on sexual conduct
between men and acts of non-vaginal penetration.2' The obsession with
these particular sexual acts explains in part why there have been fewer
oppressive measures against homosexual activity between women. For
example, lesbian sex was scarcely criminalized until the late nineteenth
century.2"' Furthermore, the legal regulation of lesbian sex seems as a
whole to have been less rigid than the prosecution of sodomy between
men.
289
285. See supra part I.B., rules 7, 8, and 11.
286. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt.1 (1962) (comments revised 1980).
287. As Ruthann Robson comments:
The oral/anal strategy usually prohibits any sexual contact between the sex
organs (described also as genitals) of one person, and the mouth or anus
of another. These statutes are anatomically specific to a certain extent, but
they also target what is generally considered sodomy-sexual contact
between a man's penis and an anus, or sexual contact between a man's penis
and a mouth, also called fellatio. A few states broaden this strategy by also
induding objects, fingers, and body parts as prohibited penetrators of sexual
organs.
Ruthann Robson, Crimes ofLesbian Sex, in LESBUANs, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra
note 284, at 80, 81.
288. "Lesbians were censured by silence; sexual acts between two women were unimagin-
able." Silvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L
REv. 187, 202. See also MODEL PENAL. CODE § 213.2 cmt.1.
289. A common patriarchal attitude toward lesbianism is to ignore or to deny its existence.
See, e.g., Arriola, supra note 283, at 283. Justice Blackmun comments on Georgia's
tradition of sodomy laws:
Until 1968, Georgia defined sodomy as "the carnal knowledge and
connection against the order of nature, by man with man, or in the same
unnatural manner with woman." Ga. Crim. Code § 26-5901 (1933). In
Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939), the Georgia
Supreme Court held that § 26-5901 did not prohibit lesbian activity. And
in Riley v. Garrett, 219 Ga. 345, 133 S. E. 2d 367 (1963), the Georgia
Supreme Court held that § 26-5901 did not prohibit heterosexual
cunnilingus. Georgia passed the act-specific statute currently in force
"perhaps in response to the restrictive court decisions such as Ri/y." Note,
The Crimes Against Nature, 16 J. Pub. L. 159, 167, n. 47 (1967).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186, 200 n.1 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Little has changed in the patriarchal strategy of gender-stereotyping
sexual behavior;2 90 the masculine role is still perceived as active and
performing, the feminine role as passive and receiving." This discrimi-
nating regime lives on despite proclamations of equality. For example, the
recent policy for dealing with homosexuals in the American armed forces,
"don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue,"292 does not affect the underlying
rules outlawing all manifestations of homosexual orientation.293 Therefore,
this policy is, in effect, the enforcement of the traditional homophobic
regime.2 94 It rejects any form of affirmative expression or lifestyle
290. As its basic strategy, the patriarchal regime dictates a discourse of heterosexuality.
"Heterosexuality is [the organized expropriation's] social structure, desire its internal
dynamic, gender and family its congealed forms, sex roles its qualities generalized to
social persona, reproduction a consequence, and control its issue." MACKwNoN,
STATE, supra note 5, at 3-4.
291. See MAcKrNNoN, Art, supra note 8, at 6-7. See also Joshua Dressier, Judicial Homo-
phobia Gay Rights' Biggest Roadblock, 5 Crv. LIBERTEs Rav. 19 (1979), reprinted in
HoMosaxuAmY: DIscamunaxToN, CRMINOLOGY, AND THE L&w 85 (Wayne R.
Dynes & Stephen Donaldson eds., 1992).
292. The American Armed Forces Policy on Gay Troops is as follows:
Sexual orientation is a personal and private matter. Officials of the
Armed Forces will not ask and service members will not be required to
reveal their sexual orientation.
Homosexual orientation alone is not a bar to service entry or continued
service unless manifested by homosexual conduct.
Homosexual conduct includes a homosexual act, a statement by the
member that demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts, or a homosexual marriage or attempted marriage. When a member
engages in homosexual conduct, he or she is subject to administrative
separation.
A statement by a member that demonstrates a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts-such as a statement by the member that he or
she is a homosexual-is grounds for separation not because it reflects the
member's sexual orientation, but because the statement indicates a likeli-
hood that the member engages in or will engage in homosexual acts.
Eric Schmitt, Gay Troops Say the Revised Policy Is Often Misused N.Y. TMEs, May
9, 1994, at Al, C10. See also Lincoln Caplan, 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Marine Style,
NEwswEK, June 13, 1994, at 28.
293. For a discussion of sexual orientation and sexual identity, see, e.g., Arriola, supra note
283, at 280-82.
294. See Seth Harris, Permitting Prejudice to Govern: Equal Protection, Military Deference,
and the Exclusion of Lesbians and Gay Men fiom the Military, 17 RLy. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 171 (1989-90), reprinted in HoMosExuAurrY: DiscnRMNATIoN, CRnMr-
NOLOGY, AND THE LAw, supra note 291, at 163; GAYs AND THE MiurrnY: JosEPH
STEFFAN vESus THE UNITED STATES (Marc Wolinsky & Kenneth Sherrill eds., 1993).
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connected with homosexual identity.291
Patriarchy denigrates, genders, sometimes explicitly labels as "femi-
nine," and often criminalizes behavior that deviates from the patriarchal
conception of masculinity. Such "feminine" men are treated as outcasts
and subjected to forms of oppression, including traditional methods of
ostracizing women. Criminally convicting men for behavior that is
gendered "non-masculine" officially stigmatizes them and constitutes
formal legal discrimination.296 For instance, these men are excluded from
official functions such as jury service or professional work at the bar or
on the bench.
The persecution of the passive male sodomite under Roman law is
evidence of patriarchys paramount power of definition. By gendering
certain men "feminine," patriarchy succeeds in transcending its initial
stereotype that connects feminine gender and female sex. Patriarchy
extends "feminine" beyond the correlating "female" and connects it with
"male," which was originally its definitional opposite (in terms of sex).297
Legal and non-legal discrimination against male homosexuals pointedly
reveals that gender, although based on sex and manifoldly related to
29829sex, is not restricted to a specific sex.299 Patriarchy designs gender
through highly artificial and arbitrary constructions when such construc-
tions are expedient for its dominance. 00
295. A person's sexuality is truly his or her most intimate sphere, but at the same time it
undeniably has public implications. (One example is Anita Hill's testimony regarding
Clarence Thomas and its enduring impact.) Insisting that gay men and lesbians stop
confronting other people with their issues of sexuality is an oppressive act of silencing
that prevents gender equality. See, e.g., Arriola, supra note 283, at 270-71. Rhode
comments on the interdependence of the public and the private spheres: "Public policy
shapes 'private' conduct, and private conduct also has public consequences in a wide
range of areas, such as divorce, employment, sexual abuse, reproductive choice, sexual
preference, single-sex institutions, and nonmarital cohabitation." RHODE, supra note
2, at 319.
296. For a discussion of homosexuality and the right to privacy, see VINCENT J. SAMA ,
THE RIGHT TO PRivAcy: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1991).
297. See supra part I.B., rule 6.
298. For the sexual elements of the feminine gender stereotype, see, e.g., MACI NNON,
STATE, supra note 5, at 109-11.
299. For a discussion of the social construction of sexual identity, see, e.g., Arriola, supra
note 283, at 287-88.
300. "Contemporary condemnation of homosexual behavior is directed primarily at the
violation of prescribed gender roles, not at sexual acts." Law, supra note 288, at 188.
For a discussion of feminizing the passive male homosexual partner in Roman
antiquity, see RICHLIN, supra note 277, at 225.
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VI. LAW, COERCION, VIOLENCE, AND PATRIARCHY
The law has been a crucial means of power for most of our history.
It has been one of the strongest threads in the fabric of society's
normative discourse.30' In political terms, the law clearly reflects the
nature of power. On the one hand, power has the potential to protect,
encourage, support, and liberate. On the other hand, it has the potential
to intimidate, confine, harm, and destroy. In terms of civil rights, power
works positively by allocating privileges and immunities, yet it works
negatively by denying such rights on the basis of improper distinctions.0 2
In reality, power is closely linked to force. The employment of force
is one method of transforming power from a potential to a concrete act.
Enforcement proceedings make power actual, and they manifest power
effectively. Furthermore, there is a mutual correlation between force and
power: the application of force can enhance power, and this increased
power may in turn strengthen its acts of coercion.
Patriarchy's success formula combines two fundamental elements-a
myth and an executive instrument. The myth of *masculine gender 03 is
that the male sex implies superiority, thus identifying inferiority with the
female sex and gendering subordinate persons as "feminine." The
executive instrument is the monopoly over coercion as a means of
expressing and actualizing men's alleged superiority. 4 Conversely, the
301. As Rifkin notes:
Law is powerful as both a symbol and a vehicle of male authority. This
power is based both on an ideology of law and an ideology of women that
is supported by law. One function of ideology is to mystify social reality
and to block social change. Law functions as a form oflhegemonic ideology.
Rifldn, supra note 9, at 84 (footnotes omitted). See also supra part I.B., rule 5.
302. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186-96 (1986) (holding that homosexuals
do not have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy).
Justice Blackmun criticizes the biased, narrow approach of the majority in'his
dissenting opinion. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The Court
claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is the
fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate
associations with others." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Blackmun further states: "Indeed, the right of an individual to conduct intimate
relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of
the Constitution's protection of privacy." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
303. See supra part I.B., rules 7 and 8.
304. See MACKiNNON, Difference, supra note 13, at 40.
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monopolization of coercion affirms the masculine gender by identifying
masculinity with effectiveness.
Patriarchal supremacy is effectuated by (highly monopolized) coercive
force that appears in two forms: violence and legal enforcement. 5
Violence functions as the intrinsic, vital component of collective and
individual masculinity.'O Every man is gendered as masculine through
some initiation into violence. This initiation may assume a variety of
forms, from actual physical combat' 7 to inconspicuous processes such as
the participation in structural violence. Violence is the source and
sustenance of male supremacy.
308
Unlike violence, which has the connotation of being vile and vicious,
legal enforcement is presumed proper and positive. However, the legal
regime, a system that by definition includes coercive actions, reveals some
close structural resemblance to violence-based power holding. From this
critical perspective, legal coercion and violence are comparable in their
use as force.
30 9
305. On the connections between violence and law, see, e.g., Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns, Making Peace with Violence: Robert Cover on Law and Legal Theory, in s~w's
VIOLENCE 211-50 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).
306. For recent discussions of violence against women, see, e.g., TESr THE WEsM.
GEScHLEcHTEDEMOKRATIE UND GEwALT (Bundesministerin ftlr Frauenan-
gelegenheiten, Johanna Dohnal ed., 1993); FmIsCIDE: THE PoLITIcs OF WoMAN
KILUNG (Jill Radford & Diana E. H. Russel eds., 1992); VIOLENCE AGAINsT WOMEN:
THE BLOODY FooTPars (Pauline B. Bart & Eileen Geil Moran eds., 1993);
Marguerite Angelari, Hate Crime Statutes: A Promising Tool for Fighting Violence
Against Women, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 63 (1994).
307. Ann Scales notes:
By "militarism" I mean the pervasive duster of forces that keeps history
insane: hierarchy, conformity, waste, false glory, force as the resolution of
all issues, death as the meaning of life, and a daim to the necessity of all
of that. Ultimately, force and gender are parts of the same death-seeking
process. For these same forces account in turn for the oppression of women
in whatever patriarchal institution-religion, state, family, academy-and
by whatever method-rape, battering, economic exploitation, rendering
invisible.
Thus, militarism should not only be on the feminist agenda. It should
be viewed as being in fundamental symbiosis with gender oppression.
Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisp rudence as O-ymo-
ron?, 12 HAnv. WoamN's UJ. 26 (1989).
308. See MACKINNON, Difference, supra note 13, at 40-41.
309. The death penalty highlights the delicacy of the distinction between legal enforcement
and violence. It is either supported as legally correct and socially expedient or rejected
as brutal, illegitimate, and immoral.
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The law is defined as the set of norms connected with official
enforcement. Therefore, it is by its very nature intrinsically linked to
state force. The law's coercive facet makes it one of the most valuable
weapons within patriarchy's arsenal. 10 Coercive force, which is the vital
strength of male hegemony, must be strictly reserved for men.311 Thus,
the maintenance of male supremacy requires rejecting, minimizing, or
at least controlling women's active participation in a substantially force-
endowed section of the regime-the courts.
CONCLUSION
Patriarchy is an oppressive regime. The nature of oppression war-
rants criticism and calls for opposition. Opposition to the patriarchal
regime is all the more legitimate and desirable because patriarchy op-
presses more than one half of the world's population. Such opposition
means political activity, including practical political strategies.
A prudent political strategy must define its goals, evaluate its
means, and assess its obstacles. The historical analysis presented in this
article contributes to the assessment of the obstacles one will encounter
in a strategic challenge to patriarchal dominance.
Societal attitudes have shifted and equality for women has become
an often-stated phrase in everyday political rhetoric. Yet it remains an
open question whether this change in discourse reflects an improvement
in gender equality.31 2 Considering the endurance that patriarchal meth-
ods, arguments, and patterns have shown,313 the path to gender equality
seems neither smooth nor short.
310. "For feminist jurisprudence, the more serious aspect of law is its relationship to
force." Scales, supra note 307, at 30.
311. See supra part I.B., rule 13.
312. "In the United States, it is acknowledged that the state is capitalist; it is not ac-
knowledged that it is male." MAcKmNoN, STATE, supra note 5, at 215. See also
MAcKNoN, STATE, supra note 5, at 237-49; MoRmLo, supra note 4, at 248-49.
Morello argues:
It is tempting to point to these significant gains and to believe that the
battle for equality is almost over. But history indicates otherwise. At
nearly every stage of their development women attorneys incorrectly
believed that once they themselves had proven their competence, accep-
tance for women in the next generation would be assured.
MoRanao, supra note 4, at 248-49.
313. See supra parts I.A. and I.B.
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The patriarchal regime has a special interest in excluding women
from the exercise of official power. History bears rich evidence of this
tradition, which is still in force. Resorting to the allegedly feminine
virtues of "modesty" and "privacy,"31 4 the patriarchs tend to create
examples315 that confirm the rule of banishing women from the public
domain. In creating such examples, the patriarchal regime disregards
those women who actually participate in public power and who could
serve as affirmative role models for women's power holding. Instead,
the patriarchs select or devise scandalous incidents3'6 and use them as
examples317 to justify barring women generally from official power. In
ensuring this exclusion, patriarchy finds it expedient to defame, silence,
incapacitate, and even dehumanize women.
3 8
The law of Roman antiquity and most of the American legal
discussion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries degrades women
primarily in terms of "nature." According to this concept of "nature,"
women are disabled in such a way that precludes their participation in
public life or official functions.319 New variations of patriarchy's
exclusionary tactics appear in the late nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries. First, liberal legalism produces formal, purportedly
ungendered correctness. In reality, however, this rhetoric serves to
institute and promote gendered policies and decisions. 20 Second, twen-
tieth century patriarchy upholds the stereotyping regime by treating the
proscribed gender roles as if they stem from experience and reflect
common sense. This approach allows patriarchy to create insidiously
appealing arguments, such as the tenet that a woman's role lies at "the
center of home and family life";32 in addition, this tactic avoids the
earlier and exhausted use of "nature" as a justification for keeping
women out of the public realm.
322
314. See supra parts II.B., IIIA.., and 1.B.
315. See supra part I.C.
316. Compare supra part III.B. (discussing the incident of electoral fraud that led to the
abolishment of women's suffrage in New Jersey in 1807).
317. See supra parts II. and V.A.
318. Compare supra part .D. (discussing Martha Copleman's experience of sexism in
the courtroom).
319. See supra parts II.B., IIA., and 1.B.
320. See supra part IILA.
321. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
322. See supra part IVC.
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The various texts discussed in this article reveal the highly manipu-
lative character of the patriarchal gender regime."z The regime relies on
the power of definition as one method of manipulation. This power of
definition is particularly manifested in two devices: patriarchy both
"feminizes" male homosexuals and stereotypes the role of women in
"domestic" terms, thus inhibiting society's capacity to envision women
in official power.
Historically, patriarchy ostracized powerful women by depicting
them as witches.324 A more recent strategy used against women who
seek positions of official power entails labelling them as "disgusting
political demagogues"325 or degrading them for otherwise contravening
the patriarchal rules of female delicacy. Today, these discriminatory
images of women remain but are mostly relegated to extra-legal spheres
of society. In contrast, patriarchy still overtly stereotypes homosexual
men as non-masculine in ways that often lead to explicit legal discrimi-
nation.
26
In recent decades, the struggle for women's civil rights has effected
some change in the legal discourse. Some of the demands for gender
equality and equity, such as suffrage, free access to jobs, equal pay, and
feminist affirmative action, have been established as principles under the
law.327 These principles cannot be blatantly attacked or explicitly refuted
in the legal discourse. However, women's recent achievements encoun-
ter substantial opposition. The resistance at the legal level328 mainly
323. For example, Rhode states that
[w]omen's "nature" has legally disqualified them from a vast range of pur-
suits, ranging from shoe-shining to legal practice and Little League base-
ball. At different times in different jurisdictions, the same "special"
attributes of womanhood have dictated opposite results; ... Not only
have sex-based differences been overvalued, they have also been over-
looked.
RaoDE, supra note 2, at 318.
324. See supra part V.A.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 105-106.
326. See supra part V.B.
327. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism, 14 WoMEN's RTs. L Rm'. 151-55 (1992).
328. On account of its intrinsically patriarchal character, the law recommends itself as an
instrument for resistance to women's liberation. "The male-dominant paradigm of
political power is also the paradigm of law. The historical image of male-
ness-objective, rational and public-is the dominant image of law." Rifldn, supra
note 9, at 92 (foomote omitted). See also supra note 223.
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operates by denying that an issue is a gender issue329 or by denying the
relevance of a gender issue.3
A main source of male supremacy is monopolized force-be it
violence or other forms of coercion.33' In the patriarchal view, abandon-
ing this monopolized position by admitting women to coercive force
would mean losing dominance. Since the law is a system inherently
related to coercion, patriarchy's hegemonical regime must vigilantly
reserve the operation of the law to men and actively resist women who
participate in official power, particularly those who perform legal func-
tions in the courts.
3 32
Fundamental progress toward gender equality will require exploring
and deconstructing the male domain of coercion-including both the
discourse of illegitimate violence and the discourse of legitimate enforce-
ment. The fight for women's opportunity to share and cultivate power
will not end until the masculine structure of coercive force is torn
down. In the future, society's treatment of homosexuals, especially of
gay men, will serve as an important test of whether, or how far, patriar-
chal dominance has given way to a culture of shared power. As long as
characterizing a man as "effeminate" degrades him (or subjects him to
even more severe sanctions), the term "feminine" will remain a weapon
in the hands of the patriarchs. The power of this weapon is the result
of two manipulations. First, the patriarchs define "femininity." Second,
the patriarchs assert their distinction that anyone "feminine" is
necessarily inferior to those who are masculine.
Patriarchal dominance continues. Yet, the call for fairness and
justice still resounds, challenging the regimes in power. If fairness and
justice-two fundamental goals of the law333-are pursued in earnest,
this call will not be silenced until gender cooperation has replaced
gender subordination. t
329. See supra part I.B., rule 12.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 210-225.
331. See supra part I.B., rule 13.
332. See supra part VI.
333. "Law can be a focal point for political organization and popular education; it can
validate injuries and in some instances deter or redress them. It can also help
redistribute power and increase the number of voices that are heard in distributive
decisions." RHODE, supra note 2, at 321.
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